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Alliance durability and intra-alliance security dilemma: a case study of 
the U.S.-Japan alliance in the light of rising China 
 
Oksana Pachomcik  
Abstract 
 
In recent years, the East-Asian security order has been witnessing a number of 
disturbances stemming from increased assertiveness of regional security actors, such as 
North Korea and, to a lesser extent, China. More specifically, the escalation of tensions 
between China and Japan over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands has called into 
question the very viability of the U.S. “hub and spoke” alliance system in the region, 
with the 60 year old U.S.-Japan alliance at its core. As a relic of bipolar Cold War great 
power competition, today the alliance faces increasingly complex and uncertain security 
environment, which effectively challenges the very foundations of the widely celebrated 
trustworthiness and durability of the security ties between the two nations.  Against this 
background, the thesis conducts a thorough examination of a salient episode, which has 
occurred and subsequently disturbed the established modes of operation within the U.S.-
Japan alliance. In particular, the overarching aim of the study is: a) to uncover and 
assess the effect exerted by the intensification of an external threat (China) on the 
severity of intra-alliance security dilemma, with an eroding balance in entrapment-
abandonment fears among the allies; b) how this phenomenon have manifested itself 
throughout the course of the Senkaku contingency; and c) what the identified anxiety-
driven processes hold for the enduring quality of the U.S.-Japanese security 
cooperation. Grounded in theoretical expectations largely derived from the realist 
school of thought, the paper concludes that, chiefly consistent with realist thinking, the 
Senkaku crisis and the respective behaviour of allies does point to: 1) the upsurge of 
intra-alliance security dilemma; 2) the importance of fluctuations in triangular Sino-
American-Japanese relationship for the magnitude of abandonment anxiety experienced 
by the weakest pole in the triangle (Japan); 3) the mitigating role of institutionalization 
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on alliance ties plagued by twin abandonment-entrapment anxieties. Yet, the paper also 
discovers, contrary to Morrow’s (1991) expectations, the preservation of asymmetrical 
nature of the alliance, as reflected in high degrees of weaker ally’s direct dependence, in 
all likelihood, would be detrimental to alliance durability, due to the importance 
attached to acquired reputations for reliability in the minds of state leaders. Hence, it 
becomes evident that phenomena such as sustained alliance durability and intensity of 
intra-alliance security dilemma cannot be fully captured by one all-encompassing realist 
approach; instead, any future inquiries into the topic of alliance durability would 
significantly benefit from a harmonious merging of insights from different schools of 
thought.  
 
Keywords:  the U.S.-Japan alliance, rising China, balance-of-threat, alliance durability, 
strategic triangle, intra-alliance security dilemma, abandonment, entrapment, reputation 
for reliability, asymmetry 
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Throughout the course of its existence, the U.S.-Japan alliance has 
established a firm reputation for “anchoring stability in Asia” via a broader network of 
the U.S. “hub and spoke” alliance system (CSIS, 2012). Yet, recent developments in the 
increasingly complex and interdependent region present the alliance with a myriad of 
challenges, at the core of which is ensuring its own survival and enduring role in East-
Asian security architecture. One of those threatening conditions is constituted by the 
“emerging contours of China’s foreign policy” in the form of “peaceful rise 2.0” 
(Zhang, 2015). The peacefulness of this rise comes across as a rather odd self-
proclaimed characteristic, given China’s increased assertiveness in the South and East 
China Seas, coupled with deliberate exploitation of international disagreements on how 
to deal with “gray zone” coercion and disregard for the provisions of international law, 
ruled by Hague tribunal as applicable in the South China Sea disputes (Foreign Policy, 
2016). However, it remains unclear how exactly such actions translate into posing a 
threat to the U.S.- Japan alliance durability. After all, it is intuitively tempting to assume 
that increased assertiveness of an external security actor, directed against one of the 
allies, would inevitably result in the strengthening of the alliance solidarity and 
cohesion.  In the context of pressing reality of security and power competition, 
however, the existence and increasing magnitude of an external threat does not directly 
translate into an undeniably strengthened alliance endurance potential. Hence, the 
question arises: can the intermediate process, characterized by dynamics of security 
dilemma of interpretation and response, offer more accurate explanations for alliance 
members’ behaviour and how this behaviour translates into the increases or decreases in 
the alliance prospects for prolonged durability? What effect, if any, the differing level of 
engagement with the perceived treat on the part of the allies exert on the operation of 
intra-alliance security dilemma, with mistrust-driven abandonment and entrapment fears 
at its core? If it causes indecision and hesitation, how does this affect the choice of 
future trajectory by partially abandoned ally? 
Building on the extensive observations stemming from the realist school of 
thought, coupled with insights of scholars of security dilemma and reputation-based 
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studies, transcending the traditional self-imposed boundaries of scientific inquiry 
(realism-constructivism-liberal institutionalism triad), this thesis examines the elements 
correspondingly cementing and eroding the U.S.-Japan durability, and how the rise of 
China, as a threat or a strategic anchor underlying the rationale for the alliance’s 
protracted existence, influences the respective severity or malleability of these 
conditions.  
Thesis structure 
The thesis proceeds on the basis of five interrelated sections. First, the 
theoretical framework for case study examination is set out, whereby: a) an effective 
definition of an alliance is established, distinguishing alliances from alignments and 
differing characteristics carried by the latter; b) balance-of-power and balance-of-threat 
theories are consulted in an attempt to single out potential indicators, which point to the 
likelihood of alliance formation, endurance and dissolution; c) the importance of past 
behaviour and reputation for reliability is being derived from formative-events model 
and complemented by reliability elements found in broader security dilemma theory; d) 
the indicators, in the form of abandonment and entrapment fears, pointing towards 
disruption in alliance cohesion are illustrated, in the context of intra-alliance security 
dilemma theory; e) the strategic triangle theory is considered as a useful tool in 
assessing why there might be a gap in alliance members’ perceptions, accompanying 
anxieties and preferred responses towards the rise of assertive activities from one pole. 
The theoretical part is followed by a section justifying the chosen methodological 
approach for answering the pre-determined research questions, outlining the positive 
and negative traits of the single case research design as a basis for empirical 
investigation. The subsequent two chapters present the empirical investigation of the 
phenomenon in question, broken into smaller subsections to ensure logical sequence of 
events and their interpretation through the lenses of the discussed theoretical 
approaches. The final chapter ties theory and case study together, while also suggesting 
future avenues for the conduct of similar research.   
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Chapter I. Theoretical framework and conceptualization 
Alliances: definition and theoretical underpinnings 
The primary task of any scientific inquiry is to offer a definition of a subject 
under investigation (Snyder, 1990: 104), despite Paul Schroeder (1976: 255) insistence 
on the idea that “categorizing alliances according to their types…[is] not likely to be 
very helpful in describing what alliances really do”. Nevertheless, the substantial part of 
the literature on alliances stems from the realist school of thought, most notably, the 
writings of Stephen Walt, who offers a rather broad working definition for an alliance - 
“a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states” 
(1987:157). Alliances differ substantially in their nature (offensive-defensive), 
capabilities and prescribed obligations (symmetrical-asymmetrical), levels of 
institutionalization and functions emanating from those (ibid.). Yet, there is an 
important distinction to be drawn here, one between alliances and alignments, which 
Walt (1985, 1987) does not outline clearly in his papers. A rather narrower definition is 
offered by Glen Snyder, suggesting that alliances “are formal associations of states for 
the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside 
their own membership” (Snyder 1997: 4). With regards to alignment-alliance spectrum, 
Snyder (1990:109) offers three distinguishing features of a genuine sustainable alliance: 
“precision, obligation and reciprocity”, whereas expectations underlying alignments 
tend to be inherently vague and uncertain, with “verbal statements” acting as a 
reassuring strategy for specific circumstances.  
Perhaps more importantly, taking into account that the alliance under 
examination (U.S.-Japan) is bilateral in its nature, one should consider broad distinctive 
features of such an alliance. For instance, Ikenberry and Inoguchi (2003) insist that 
U.S.-Japan alliance has developed beyond a bilateral military pact, towards a “political 
partnership”, whose endurance rests on the successful evolution of an effective 
institutional mechanism. In a more general sense, Rafferty (2003) states that bilateral 
alliances are often characterized by the informal nature of liaison between the parties, 
which takes the form of expectations rather than obligations, the resulting lack of formal 
7 
 
supervisory bodies and, hence, greater degree of flexibility. Notably, the author does not 
link low degrees of institutionalization with relative weakness of an alliance as a whole.  
Balance of power
1
 and balance of threat 
Since, in broad terms, one can view alliance durability through the lens of 
prevalent modes of alliance behavior in the face of shifts in international system, it is 
also worthwhile to consider insights offered by Kenneth Waltz’s (1979). Waltz, in line 
with balance-of-power theory, suggests that, in practice, alliances tend to follow the 
path of “balancing”2and “bandwagoning”3, which carry certain implications on the 
likelihood of alliance collapse (Waltz, 1979). Additional modes of alliance behaviour - 
“buck-passing” (loosening alliance commitments) and chain-ganging” (tightening 
alliance commitments) (Waltz, 1979) – are of particular relevance here. In the context of 
U.S.-Japan alliance, Lind (2004, 2016) suggests that the former constitutes “the 
foundation of Japan’s national security strategy”, which is centered not around pacifist 
attitudes, but rather a conscious strategy of “buck-passing”, whereby Japanese allies are 
obligated to pay the “cost of balancing security in East Asia”.  Needless to say this 
strategy of deliberate restraint is bound to result in frustrations and anxieties within the 
alliance, what ultimately endangers its vitality and sets the stage for its gradual 
dissolution.  
This implicitly points to alliance durability and vitality being inextricably 
linked to the existing balance of threat (Walt, 1987), given that the rationale or meaning 
of an alliance relies heavily on the existence of “the adversary threat to which they are a 
response” (Snyder, 1997: 192). Strachan-Morris (2010) refers to a threat as “a function 
of the enemy’s capability and intent to conduct attacks… ‘threat’ = capability x intent”. 
Lowell Ditmmer (2014: 2), drawing on Walt’s (2009) observations on alliance 
behaviour in a unipolar international setting, notes that facing a threat, the concerned 
                                                          
1
 Interestingly,the fact that Japan chose to form and maintain the alliance with the US, which is 
considered as a stronger state, somewhat contradicts Waltz’s balance-of-power theotretical predictions 
that the anarchic structure of the international arena coerces states to join the weaker side.  Here, Walt’s 
balance-of-threat carries more of an explanatory value, in suggesting that states align with the less 
threatening side, as illustrated by experience of Eastern Europe (Snyder, 1990).  
2
 Occurs when a stronger state joins a weaker one.  
3
 Occurs when a weaker one joins the stronger one.  
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state possesses two options: a) appeasing or forming alliance ties “with the source of the 
threat (“bandwagoning”)” b) resisting the threat through: increases in self-strengthening 
and self-reliance (internal balancing), or by forming or upgrading the existing alliance 
ties with another country “with common interest in resisting the source of threat” as a 
way of “external balancing”. More specifically, Walt (1987), maintaining that 
formation, endurance and dissolution of alliances is a reaction to changes in external 
threats
4
, presents several cues that point to a process of deterioration within the alliance.  
The following observations, even if largely theoretical in their nature and 
rather scarcely supported by empirical evidence, constitute a departure point for this 
thesis’ theoretical background, especially given that Walt couples alliance formation, 
endurance and even gradual dissolution not with the predominant global balance of 
power (Waltz, 1979), but rather the rise and demise of external threats. Walt’s (1987: 
159) pre-conditions for alliance deterioration are:  
i. Accumulation of strength by one ally, implying that the state is seeking 
to eliminate dependence and necessity to rely on other countries for its own security. 
Here, increasing growth in defense budgets along with broader efforts at extensive 
militarization by a (weaker) ally would signify that alliance glue or rationale is fading, 
and the entire security liaison is about to be terminated. Yet, this inference is 
incomplete, as it fails to acknowledge the importance of burden-sharing for allied 
solidarity building and alliance desirability, more generally.  
ii. Shifting “magnitude or identity of the main threat” (Walt, 1987). While it 
is tempting to assume that the shift towards a more aggressive stance by the adversary 
would inevitably trigger the strengthening of the alliance, one still has to keep in mind 
vested interests and differing threat perceptions, which, instead of confrontation, might 
lead to accommodation and engagement strategies. Moreover, the differences in 
perceptions might lead to miscommunication and deadlock within the particular 
                                                          
4
 This implies that the differences in reaction to external threats is pre-determined by existing divergences 




alliance, inviting mutual suspicion and unwillingness to get entangled in conflicts over 
an unreliable ally.   
iii. Change in domestic political configurations, and the effect it exerts on 
preferred security trajectories. Here, the implication is that a more nationalistic party 
might resort to isolationism and increasing autonomous strike capabilities, not 
necessarily in the form of a strategy for equalizing burden-sharing.  
Walt (1987) complements these with endurance ensuring factors, or elements 
that will keep the alliance together despite any major power and threat transitions in the 
region:  
i. Preserved credibility/reputation for reliability or states assessing its ally’s 
recent behavior. This will be discussed in a more detailed manner in the context of 
security dilemma.   
ii. High levels of institutionalization (Walt, 1987: 166):   “the greater the 
level of institutionalization within an alliance, the more likely it is to endure despite an 
extensive change in the array of external threats”. In this paper, institutionalization is 
treated on a par with efforts at formalization, as represented by the revision of the 
official Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Cooperation. Ruggie’s (1998) definition stands as 
most applicable to intra-alliance behavior, he links routine communication, routine 
organizational interactions and mutually intelligible behaviour as primary determinants 
of the degree to which particular ties are institutionalized. Whereas, Smith (1999) draws 
an explicit causal relationship between institutionalized ties and probability of enduring 
cooperation.  
iii. Prevalence and preservation of asymmetry in power within the alliance, 
which allows the relationship to thrive by making the alliance “easier to adapt to new 
conditions and…better equipped to handle the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise” 
(Walt, 1987: 170). Interestingly, an empirical study conducted by Mahan (1977) 
disproves such theoretical expectation by concluding, through a careful examination of 
British naval ties, that for cooperation between allies to endure, there has to exist a 
sustained equality in obligations and capabilities of the partners.  
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Formative-events model and importance of mistrust 
Even though realism is the leading school of thought when it comes to the 
generation of explanations of alliance patterns and behaviour, it is important not to 
neglect one no less influential approach based on formative-events model of learning, as 
presented by Reiter (1994).  In its very essence, Reiter’s findings show, contrary to 
balance-of-threat theory, that states’ decisions regarding alliances are not responses to 
the level of international threat, but rather a result of an attempt to avoid past mistakes 
and repeat past successes. In Reiter’s own words, “success promotes continuity and 
failure stimulates innovation”, hence the critical, salient events in alliance history would 
serve as a test for both allies (1994:526).  However, this paper will rely on Reiter’s 
contentions only partially, and in the context of reputation costs and credibility of 
commitments achieved through handling of a salient issue, namely, the Senkaku island 
dispute. It should be noted, however, that Reiter’s theory is applicable largely to 
alliances among minor powers, although there is nothing to suggest that it would not 
generate any reliable or interesting knowledge if applied to the alliances formed 
between two major powers, especially if the applicability of both Waltz’s balance of 
power and Walt’s balance-of-threat theory proves to be limited and their explanatory 
power insufficient. Moreover, Reiter’s approach can be complemented by adding an 
explicit dimension of an external threat and how it, deliberately or not, meddles with the 
alliance cohesion. 
Furthermore, it becomes evident that while structural realists do acknowledge 
the damaging effects of mistrust in state relations, which serve as a trigger for fear 
driven security dilemmas, the role of trust between allies (rather than adversaries) 
remains somewhat obscured. More specifically, even though Walt (1987) does refer to 
credibility as one of the key conditions for forming and maintaining effective alliances, 
there is no explicit mentioning of the role that mutual trust plays in alliance dynamics.  
Kydd (2001) further develops the concept of trust between states, in the context of 
reassurance strategies.  In short, Kydd (2001:326) holds that trust stands for “a belief 
that the other side is likely to be trustworthy and will therefore want to reciprocate 
cooperation rather than exploit it”, whereas costly signals serve as a way to distinguish 
between trustworthy and untrustworthy types. However, assuming that states which 
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have already formed alliance ties perceived each other as trustworthy enough, the 
question arises: what developments within the alliance might serve as a signal of fading 
trust? 
Security dilemma and security paradox 
Largely derived from the defensive structural realist school of thought, the 
concept of security dilemma, with the inevitable condition of uncertainty at its core, 
appears to carry certain explanatory value when it comes to assessing security ties 
forged between states. Building on the pioneer scholars in the realm of security 
dilemma, John Herz and Herbert Butterfield
5
, Ken Booth and Nicolas J. Wheeler 
present their own definition in an attempt to capture “the complex interrelationship of 
both psychological [applicable to the first level] and material dimensions”: 
“The security dilemma is a two-level strategic predicament in 
relations between states and other actors, with each level 
consisting of two related lemmas <…> which force decision-
makers to choose between them. The first and basic level 
consists of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, 
intentions and capabilities of others; the second and derivative 
level consists of a dilemma of response about the most rational 
way of responding. <…>When leaders resolve their dilemma of 
response in a manner that creates a spiral of mutual hostility, 
when neither wanted it, a situation has developed which we call 
the security paradox” [emphasis in original text] (2008: 4-5). 
It is important to note, that even though this conceptualization is deliberately 
broad in a sense that it effectively incorporates non-state actors, this paper, nonetheless, 
maintains the original emphasis on the states as primary actors or ultimate decision-
makers in the context of the operation and dynamics of security dilemma. In fact, 
                                                          
5
 The rather early versions of security dilemma conceptualisation presented by Herz and Butterfield 
(separately) is deemed too broad, rather fatalistic and, in Butterfield’s case, overly infused with 
philosophy (invoking the idea of “Hobbesian fear” and “man’s universal sin” (in Booth and Wheeler, 
2008: 30, Butterfield 1951: 22),  for the purposes of this paper.   
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Thomas J. Christensen argues that the traditional, state-centric, concept of security 
dilemma is highly applicable to East Asian security order, characterized by “security 
interdependence<…>normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security 
complexes” resembling the structure of “the balance-of-power Europe of the nineteenth 
century”6 (Buzan, 2003: 149), and the resulting ‘knottiness’ “that increases the 
difficulty of balancing simultaneous threats and assurances” (Christensen, 2002: 7).   
This is not to imply that any occurring security dilemma in the region carries 
“unpleasant choices” and pre-determined grim outcomes, even though the centrality and 
inevitability of negative alternatives has become somewhat a form of “habits of 
thought”, predominant among “theorists and practitioners of International Relations” 
(Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 6).  Herz (1950:235) himself, in a rather gloomy manner, 
asks: “how could [one] trust in the continuance of good intentions…with leaders and 
policies forever changing?” However, despite “the existential condition of unresolvable 
uncertainty”7 continuously generating fear and mistrust (Booth and Wheeler, 1992:30),  
the existing and developing security paradoxes mentioned above can be resolved with 
the introduction of a “key attitudinal variable” – security dilemma sensibility8, or 
“responsiveness towards” and awareness about the “complexity of the military 
intentions”, and how one’s actions might trigger fear in others (Booth and Wheeler, 
2008: 7). From this, it becomes evident that for the security dilemma to be genuine, 
actors must be benign security seekers; or as Kydd (1997:153) puts it, “sheep in sheep’s 
clothing” on their quest for security do not end up in conflict “in the absence of 
genuinely aggressive states”; in Herz’s words, there is no security dilemma when facing 
a Hitler (1950:234). This is because status quo powers are perceived as perfectly 
capable of adequate signaling of their intentions, especially in the context of alliance 
commitments between two democracies, where the severity of security dilemma and, 
                                                          
6
 In this analogy, China is seen as a replica of 19
th 
century Germany: “big, centrally located, rapidly 
increasing in its absolute and relative power, has border problems and historical enmities with several of 
its neighbours, has an authoritarian government, backs onto Russia, and is in nationalist mood. Many in 
the region fear rising Chinese military power and assertiveness” (Buzan, 2003: 150).  
7
 ’The problem of other minds’ and uncertainty of knowledge, as illustrated by Wendt (1999:281).  
8
 It is important to note, that Butterfield (1951: 15) was highly skeptical of the idea that policy 
practitioners, as compared to historians, possess the necessary skills and knowledge to exercise security 
dilemma sensitivity.  
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more specifically, fears about future preferences of state leaders, are mitigated by 
relatively stable foreign policy directions (Gaubatz, 1996).   
Interestingly, in the world of offensive realism, the necessity to exercise 
security dilemma sensibility withers away completely, in the light of Mearsheimer’s 
alternative prescriptions of replacing dilemmas of interpretation and response with 
assuming the worst and accumulating power accordingly, in a strife of becoming “the 
most powerful state in the system” (2001: 33). From this, it follows that, since the 
“intentions are ultimately unknowable”, and the levels of fear depend on “the changes in 
the distribution of power”, which in turn compel entities to “engage in militarized 
security competition” and behave in ways that can easily be labeled as “hostile or 
revisionist” (Mearsheimer, 2001:45, Booth and Wheeler, 2008: 37), security dilemma 
operates
9
 very briefly in the world of offensive realism and “predatory” states 
(Schweller, 1996). In other words, there is no need for Kydd’s costly signaling and 
reassurance strategies when the last resort is always building up the offensive potential
10
 




Translated into intra-alliance dynamics, security dilemma, and increased 
accumulation of military power more specifically, carries slightly different 
characteristics. First, it should be noted that the establishment of security cooperation 
between two or more states already indicates that there is some basic level of trust or 
sufficient convergence of interests. Yet, as states interact with each other and with the 
external security actors, trust can end up being eroded, and common interests 
overshadowed by new security agendas. Second, the security dilemma and security 
paradox in the context of alliance politics has slightly different nature and less 
                                                          
9
 Snyder (2002) argues that there cannot be any security dilemmas in the environments occupied by 
aggressive states; instead, it is the perpetual security competition that takes place.   
10
 Interestingly, as forming military alliances with other states can be considered as a form of power 
accumulation, especially if one party to the arrangement is a great power, it can be argued that certain 
alliances trigger security dilemma, but with regards to the state against which the alliance is perceived 
(either by the state itself, or by allies) to be formed. This invites a crucial question, do alliances serve their 
ultimate purpose of increasing security, or is the formation and strengthening of alliance ties in the face of 
 a newly emerging threat is based on a self-defeating logic.    
11
 Snyder (1984, 1990) also refers to it as a trade-off.  
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calamitous consequences than the dilemma occurring between two states without 
established security liaisons. In a sense, it is less severe, given the relative predictability 
of intentions and the resulting ability to exercise security dilemma sensitivity. Snyder 
(1984, 1990) presents perhaps the most convincing account of the ways in which 
security dilemma, along with the trust issues underlying it. is likely to affect the 
enduring quality of a particular alliance.   
As in the original security dilemma operating under the rules of anarchic 
international arena, intra-alliance security dilemma can too be characterized by 
uncertainty in ally's intentions, especially when one party is rapidly accumulating power 
in three following ways: "armament, territorial aggrandizement and alliance formation" 
(Snyder, 1984: 461).  For analytical purposes, Snyder breaks down intra-alliance 
security dilemma into two categories: primary and secondary (1984: 462). With regards 
to the primary security dilemma, the scholar suggests that in a multi-polar world, such 
as pre-1945, if each state is equally strong, the prevailing tendency will be to abstain 
from forming an alliance and, in doing so, avoid the costly commitments such 
arrangements usually entail (ibid.). However, there are two instances where alliances are 
going to form nevertheless: a) when moderate security is not satisfactory and the 
building of alliance ties is likely to enhance it; b) when one party fears to find itself in 
isolation, in case the other party does not abstain from establishing an alliance with 
other interested parties (Snyder, 1984: 462). It is worth noting that especially the latter 
fear-induced logic might serve as an explanatory factor in any assessment of why 
certain alliances endure.    
Abandonment 
For Snyder, the two major “bads” embedded in the dynamics of alliance 
security dilemma are: abandonment and entrapment by an ally (1984: 466, first 
developed by Michael Mandelbaum
12
). Even more so, in a multi-polar world, he asserts, 
there is considerably less firmness in alliance commitments and less importance 
attached to the written text (ibid.). This inherently means that abandonment, 
or defection, does not exclusively stand for an ally withdrawing 
                                                          
12
 Mandelblaum, M. (1981) The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima. 
 New York: Cambridge University Press.
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troops or physically retreating in times of crisis. Instead, it can take shape of an ally 
realigning “with the opponent; he may merely de-align, abrogating the alliance contract; 
he may fail to make good on his explicit commitments; or he may fail to provide 
support in contingencies where support is expected” (Snyder, 1984: 466). Importantly, 
neither of the last two occurrences would necessarily lead to the immediate dissolution 
of the alliance, yet the weakening would take place with regards to the “expectations of 
support which underlie it”, leading to suspicion and potential preemptive realignment 
(Snyder, 1984:466-7).  For instance, in the context of Europe, the perpetual fear existed 
that U.S. will sooner or later either “relapse into isolationism or [end up] establishing a 
“condominium” with the Soviet Union” (Snyder, 1990: 119). The swings in 
abandonment-entrapment balance naturally followed suit.  
Intuitively speaking, another alternative course of action triggered by rather 
extreme fears of abandonment is developing autonomous strike capabilities. Here, 
Snyder (1990: 112-3, 116) contends that, as “the principal common interest in any 
alliance is holding it together, [and] the principal source of conflict is the stance to be 
taken toward the adversary”, one should be wary of dire consequences of the “adversary 
game” running in parallel to allied interactions, whereby “when adversaries compromise 
their disputes in order to reduce tension, the solidarity of their alliances is weakened, 
and when allies tighten their bonds, tension with their adversaries rises”. In other words, 
engaging the adversary by one ally implies that there is a threat perception gap (Jervis, 
1976) within the alliance, which in turn fuels the abandonment-entrapment anxieties 
within the security arrangement. Yet, the question remains, how the fears of 
abandonment and potential strive for autonomous strike capability translate into a threat 
to alliance cohesion and long-term endurance.  
James D. Morrow’s statistical examination of 164 military alliances (1816-
1965) presents “the autonomy-security trade-off model”, which posits that “regardless 
of the type of alliance, the greater the change in its members’ individual capabilities, the 
more likely it will be broken”, meaning that the shift towards more symmetry in terms 
of allies’ commitments and contributions lowers the overall “valuation” of the alliance 
as a guarantor of one’s security (1991: 904, 907). However, while the increase in the 
pace of militarization by one ally intuitively leads to an assumption that the tensions 
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with the main threat are on the rise, this somewhat overlooks the internal alliance 
mechanism of attaching labels. This means that the development of autonomous 
capabilities might as well be treated as a reassurance signal and an attempt to get rid of 
a “free-rider” label13 by engaging in a more equal burden-sharing (Olson and 
Zeckhauser, 1966: 273). Such situations carry a significant potential to create an 
alliance-specific paradox
14
, where equalization in burden-sharing by accumulation of 
more defense capabilities eradicates the necessity or rationale for the alliance itself, 
because the ally no longer has to rely on others for its security. Here, the issue of 
(unequal) dependence and what implications it has for alliance behavior and 
sustainability surfaces.  
Direct and Indirect Dependence  
In a similar fashion to Morrow’s (1991) premise about detrimental effects of 
reductions in asymmetry, Snyder (1984: 471) highlights the importance of diverging 
levels of dependence
15
, but placing it more explicitly in the context of the twin anxieties 
of intra-alliance security dilemma: abandonment and entrapment. He breaks down the 
concept of direct dependence into four elements
16
 (1984: 472):  
 i. “a state's need for assistance in war as a function of the extent to which 
its military capability falls short of its potential adversary's capability; 
 ii. its partner's capacity to supply the assistance (the greater the partner's 
strength, the more one is dependent on him, up to the point where the combined strength 
provides sufficient security); 
                                                          
13
 Waltz (cited in Snyder 1990: 121) terms this phenomenon as “freedom of irresponsible”, highly 
applicable in the European context, in which the US is the credible provider of Europe’s “ultimate 
protection, [while the Europeans] are to indulge their own preferences or make ego-bolstering "Euro-
gestures”.  
14
 Admittedly, the issue of intra-alliance paradoxes stands as a largely unexplored area in alliance 
 literature.
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 The exact formulation by Snyder (1984): “the more dependent a state is, and/or the less dependent the 
ally appears to be, the more likely it is that the costs and risks of abandonment will outweigh the costs and 
risks of entrapment“ 
16
 What this conceptualization clearly overlooks, however, is the importance of domestic political 
configurations, and the value placed in the alliance and its perceived necessity by the general public.  In 




 iii. the state's degree of conflict and tension with the adversary (the greater 
the conflict and tension, the more likely one will have to call on the partner for help); 
and 
 iv. the state's realignment alternatives (the more numerous the alternatives, 
and the more satisfactory they are, the less the dependence on the present partner)”. 
On the top of this, Snyder (1984: 473) suggests that strategic interests of the 
allies form the basis of “indirect dependence”, affecting “the partners' relative fears of 
abandonment”.  In the realm of indirect dependence, Snyder observes slightly different 
patterns of alliance security dilemma, hypothesizing that while “the stronger ally will be 
less directly dependent than its partner but more indirectly dependent”, leaving the 
stronger state with “less leverage” (1984: 473).  This distinctive asymmetry is 
attributable to “geographical factors and disparity of power” 17 (ibid.) Yet, in the context 
of both, direct and indirect, dependence, Snyder (1984: 477) contends that past behavior 
of the ally enters state’s calculation of chances of being abandoned in the case of crisis.  
On the top of that, “a formal, explicit contract” stands as a complementary mitigating 
factor in the abandonment fears with asymmetrical dependence as their cause (Snyder, 




In a more ambitious and recent attempt, Crescenzi et al (2012:260) ties the 
perceived "attractiveness" of the alliance partner and the overarching "alliance 
formation calculus" with accumulated "reputation for reliability", whereby "positive 
expectation that the alliance will hold in the event of conflict" forms the basis for the 
alliance sustained existence. While this theory, and reliability as an explanatory 
factor, is primarily applied to the (potential) inception of new alliances, it also offers 
some valuable insights into the existing security arrangements and the prospects of their 
endurance. More specifically, one can draw parallels with how ally's 
credibility/reliability feeds into the other's fears of entrapment or abandonment.  
                                                          
17
 Yet again, it is important to acknowledge the role played by domestic politics, shifts in indirect 
dependence, or so-called strategic interests, might be the result of changes in domestic political 
configurations and shifting public attitudes. 
 18 Used interchangeably with the term credibility throughout this paper. 
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However, while the study covers a wide range of alliances throughout history, 
“observing how potential partners have performed in upholding their alliance 
commitments”, it does not explicitly state what constitutes an ultimate breach of 
commitment. Here, Andrew O’Neal (2011: 1456), in his study of potential redundancy 
of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia, suggests that there are three basic 
conditions on which credibility, which underlies stability and relevance of the US 
presence, rests:  a) the U.S.’s willingness to enforce and act upon its obligations; b) the 
reassured adversary that the U.S. posture is firm in adhering to its alliance 
commitments, c) the trust and confidence placed in the U.S. ability and readiness to 
honour and respect their security concerns. On a similar note, McNamara (2016: 14) 
adds that an observable  “breakdown concerning any side of this triad” will push allies 
to consider alternative routes to ensuring their security and survival.  
Importantly, a concept of hesitation, “buying time” or so called “waffling” in 
the face of imminent crisis (Teraoka, 2015) is not accounted for in this study; instead, it 
stands as a sort of a “gray area”, which, while not technically constituting a legitimate 
violation, nevertheless carries a potential to damage credibility of a “waffling” ally. 
Needless to say, it is a highly challenging task trying to capture hesitation adequately, 
since it is inherently a non-event. However, in the context of the matters of great 
urgency, the response time of a credible security-ensuring partner is intuitively expected 
to be rapid or at the very least accelerated.  
On a related note, Gibler’s (2008: 428) study, while not explicitly mentioning 
the detrimental effect of hesitation
19
 on alliance cohesion, does point to the tendency of 
“enemies to challenge more forcefully and in more situations” due to “consistent 
backing down”. The conducted investigation entailed a number of hypotheses, but one 
particularly important (and confirmed) in the context of this paper was “H5: [s]tates are 
less likely to be targeted by a dispute if they have outside defense pacts with states that 
have honored their commitments in the past” (Gibler, 2008: 433). In other words, a 
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 Citing Sartori’s study, Gibler chooses to use the term “bluffing”, which carries a different meaning 
given that it is a consciously deceptive strategy, while hesitation is more benign and perhaps more 
justifiable in its very nature.  
19 
 
failure to dissuade the adversary from pursuing confrontational tactics directed against 
the weaker ally, which was harboring “consistent expectations of cooperation” and the 
deterrent effect of a defense umbrella provided by the stronger ally, reveals a certain 
degree of fragility in credible commitments, which in turn leads to fractured alliance 
ties
20
 (Gibler, 2008: 429). Paradoxically enough, Gibler (2008: 450) eventually 
discovers that not only a failure to commit, but also, any “costly way” of honoring those 
commitments, is likely to end up in yet another deterrence fiasco. Here, Gibler’s (2008: 
450) explanations come across as somewhat speculative in their nature: he claims that, 
if rivals are sufficiently able to challenge the existing security arrangement and the 
stronger ally is faced with a necessity to “honor a commitment, [this] suggests a sign of 
weakness in the partner or in the alliance itself”. While Gibler’s study does shed some 
light on the enormously delicate nature of the situation the stronger ally might find itself 
in, by also revealing the operation of a basic intra-alliance security dilemma
21
, it fails to 
fully appreciate the second element to this dilemma, which carries a potential to explain 
hesitations and “backing down”, namely the fear of entrapment.  
Entrapment  
Looking at the abandonment fears caused by distancing through hesitation, 
the question arises as to what exactly causes this occurrence between formally 
committed partners. Viewing the issue of “backing down” through the theoretical lens 
presented by Snyder (1984:468), states resort to keeping the promises "tentative or 
vague for as long as possible" in order to maximize bargaining leverage and avoid 
entrapment caused by the over-confidence, which is an outcome of a strategy of strong 
commitment. However, the “weakening of commitments and withholding support, 
while acting as a restraining force on a reckless ally, also increases the risks of 
                                                          
20 Admittedly, it would be a crude oversimplification to suggest that there is a clearly identifiable causal 
mechanism here, since most of the elements of this phenomena can hardly be captured by the existing 
research tools. Yet, the association between these variables remains, if largely intuitive, is partially 
backed by existing studies (Teraoka, 2015).   
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conscious choice to violate an alliance commitment once the crisis is deemed to be dangerous enough, 
can be equated with Mearsheimer’s worst-case scenario reasoning applied to the anarchic international 




abandonment and reduces reputation for loyalty, these stand as pre-requisites for the 
eventual dissolution of an alliance”  (Snyder, 1984: 469).   Interestingly, Snyder also 
identifies a link between the strengthening of the alliance ties and the subsequent 
behaviour of the key adversary: the solidifying of the alliance leads to increases in the 
"degree of threat", as perceived by the adversary, whereas weak commitment "reduces 
this effect" (ibid.). Evidently, this theoretical expectation runs in a slight contradiction 
to Gibler’s (2008) study. Yet, it would be a crude oversimplification to assume that the 
intensified treat perception automatically translates into the adoption of an aggressive 
posture either by an ally or the adversary (see Table 1 for delineation of potential 
responses), since the former requires for the gap of threat perception within alliance to 
be narrow, and the latter has an opportunity to exercise security dilemma sensibility by 
observing the anxieties within the opposing alliance.  
In simple terms, as it has been evidenced, entrapment, stands for being 
dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests, which are not necessarily shared, carry 
similar weight or are valued to a similar degree (Snyder, 1984: 467). For this to occur 
and not to have a deteriorating effect, as Snyder (1984) contends, one has put significant 
value into the preservation of the alliance; and that inherently points to a great level of 
dependence and great willingness to commit as a per-condition for entrapment fears to 
materialize without an ally defecting. Needless to say, the anxieties of entrapment  
usually run on both sides, especially if there are considerable divergences in security 
postures and strategic trajectories of the countries. 
 Nevertheless, Kim (2011) presents an alternative view on this concept, 
suggesting that the occurrences of being entrapped against one’s will are extremely rare, 
and the importance attached to this variable, as an explanation of disturbances within 
the alliance, is considerably misplaced.  More specifically, Kim (2011: 3-4) suggests 
that entrapment is severely understudied precisely because of the lack of such an 
occurence within the alliance context: "little accumulation of knowledge on the 
phenomenon of entrapment, and contractual aspects of alliances". He insists that 
alliances are contracts, hence, entrapment stands as a misleading term, which should be 
replaced by a broader notion of entanglement “that is precipitated by offensive or risky 
behavior not agreed upon in advance”, and which is an expected outcome of alliance 
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arrangements in general (Kim, 2011: 9, 12).  Kim criticizes both, Snyder and 
Mandelblaum for failing to capture this opportunistic element of intra-alliance security 
dilemma, claiming that it distorts theoretical and policy expectations within the field of 
alliance management and sustainability (ibid.). Interestingly, tying this notion to the 
strategy of inaction, waffling (Teraoka, 2015) or general hesitation of an ally in 
providing instant support during the times of crisis, it appears to be the case that 
hesitation does not carry much of an explanatory value when it comes to alliance 
endurance, because an ally will eventually adhere if the commitments are clearly 
outlined and interests converge.  
Overall, it becomes evident, that Snyder’s conceptualization captures the 
external threat dimension, something that was largely dismissed by other studies, quite 
eloquently. Importantly, Snyder (1990: 109, 116) suggests, that in the face of an 
intensifying external threat, the alliance behaviour and its endurance prospects become 
more dependent on “verbal utterances of many kinds- —diplomatic notes, official 
statements, etc.— as well as physical acts, such as movements of forces”, and 
divergences in strategic interests can be rectified through political interactions in the 
form of “friendly gestures, concessions, symbolic demonstrations”. It is important to 
acknowledge that Snyder’s (1984) study is largely theoretical; it does not offer 
sufficient empirical backing, especially with regards to assessment and classification of 
different degrees of conflict with the opponent. For instance, it does not incorporate the 
crucial element of costly signaling and it is somewhat dismissive of differing threat 
perceptions between the allies. It appears to be the case that Snyder equates “disparity 
of interests in conflict with the opponent” with diverging threat perceptions, instead of 
treating perceptions as a source of those differing interests. However, this study will 
rely heavily on Snyder’s identified factors of “explicitness [or vagueness] of 
commitments, behavioral record… [and] differences vis-à-vis the opponent” as 
“proximate determinants…of likelihoods” of the abandonment-entrapment fear-








“Romantic” strategic triangle theory 
The severity of security dilemma between the perceived adversaries and the 
abandonment-entrapment balance between the allies, which effectively translates into 
the question of alliance durability (Cohen, 2005: 6), can be viewed as a result of the 
balancing dynamics, quality of bilateral relationship (Dittmer, 1992) or degree of (or 
deadliness) relative power distribution among the poles of a “strategic triangle” 
(Schweller, 1998). As an analytical construct, a strategic triangle rests on three 
conditions largely derived from Waltz’s (1979) observations: sovereignty, rationality of 
actors, whose policies are not “inhibited from expedient maneuver by alliance 
commitments or ideological dogmatism”; contingency of the trilateral relationship, 
centrality of each participant “to the game at least insofar as a “defection” would 
critically shift the strategic balance” (Dittmer, 2014: 10).  The configurations of such 
triangles, carrying differing outcomes with regards to operation of security dilemmas, 
rest on “oversimplified” positive (amity) or negative (enmity) nature of interactions, 
whereby differing levels of amity and enmity form: a) unit veto triangle, b)stable 
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marriage, c)romantic triangle, d) ménage a trois (Dittmer, 2014: 11). This clearly 
elucidates deficiencies inherent in realist approaches, treating enmity/amity relations as 
given, instead of being dependent on identity-constructing interactions between the 
states, which are also rooted in cultural and historical legacies; in this framework, it is 
implied that a transformation of the triangle is a result of changes in the surrounding 
international environment.   Hence, it is important not to exaggerate the importance of 
operation of the everlasting balance in power distribution and its stabilizing effects, as 
promoted by structural realists. Indeed, power transition theory posits that the 
emergence of a new power, which effectively threatens to surpass the existing hegemon, 
not only cannot be discounted as predominantly unbelligerent occurrence
23
, but instead 
should be viewed as one of the key determinants in the evolution of trilateral 
relationships, a pre-condition for endangered solidarity between the existing allies, 
especially if the middle power is impotent in reinforcing “the dominant state’s power 
preponderance over its potential challenger…[and playing] a mediating role of 
persuading the rising potential challenger to be more satisfied with the status quo” 
(Kim, 2015: 251).  
In a similar manner, Ito (2003) suggests that structural logic of “triangles” 
aids in a more detailed exploration of abandonment fears experienced by a state, which 
finds itself at the weakening pole. More specifically, he draws inspiration from Nixon’s 
opening to China in 1972, as a clearest illustration of the interplay of Japanese 
abandonment fears, which triggered Japanese leaders to normalize relationship with 
China on their part, inspiring “US policymakers with fear of a growing Sino-Japanese 
collaboration” (Ito, 2003: 16). However, in particular context, it is important not to 
dismiss the fact that during the Cold War era, the U.S.-Japan alliance was also operating 
under pressures of trilateral U.S.-China-USSR relationship, which carried a significant 
potential to shift enmity/amity balance in the U.S.-China-Japan triangle. However, with 
Russia gradually adopting more assertive postures in its neighbourhood, it becomes 
evident that there are certain structural resemblances between Cold War era and the 21
st
 
century strategic Sino-American-Japanese triangle, which requires closer examination 
                                                          
23
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Tammen, et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century. New York: Chatham House. 
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in order to capture the potential effect it exhibits on the cohesion and durability of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance ties. However, one has to be wary of equating current Russia and 
USSR, as well as treating China as neatly filling the threat vacuum left by USSR as a 
strategic anchor for the alliance to rely on.    
Limitations and merging of theories in the spirit of analytical eclecticism 
Evidently, the conceptual apparatus for framing and assessing the topic of 
alliance durability, adopted in this paper, relies heavily on the insights presented within 
the realist school of thought, with balance of threat theory, intra-alliance security 
dilemma, and structural triangles at its core. This is not to imply that such an approach 
is the most suitable for examining alliance behaviour and durability in the 21
st
 century.  
In fact, constructivist focus on the effects that domestic configurations exert on norms, 
which underlie institutional stability and perseverance, and the respective shifts in state 
identity would aid in any explanation of Japan’s choices in choosing certain security 
trajectories. In fact, Katzenstein and Okawara (1993: 104) employ constructivist 
analytical framework in investigating Japan’s security posture shifts from flexible to 
more rigid, and eventually contend that “the normative consensus that embraces 
Japanese security policy is shaped by the historical lessons of World War II and the 
reemergence of Japan as a peaceful and prosperous actor in world politics since 1945”. 
In the meantime, a more recent application of constructivist theoretical expectations by 
Singh (2008) serves to disprove the prevailing consensus that Japan possesses an 
enduring peace-state identity. He claims that it is “the international-state label” that 
captures Japanese emerging security policy in the most accurate manner (Singh, 2008: 
304).  
However, exclusive adherence to constructivist explanations and normative 
constraints is likely to fall short of capturing the importance of external dimension of 
alliance politics. In fact, a number of scholars increasingly resort to a form of analytic 
eclecticism with the Pragmatist Ethos at its core, famously defended by Albert 
Hirschman, observing that: “ordinarily, social scientists are happy enough when they 
have gotten hold of one paradigm or line of causation. As a result, their guesses are 
often farther off the mark than those of the experienced politician whose intuition is 
more likely to take a variety of forces into account.” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 3). In a 
25 
 
more concrete context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, as a crucial part of Japan’s security 
policy, Katzenstein insists that the “broadening of theoretical spectrum” calls for an 
alternative approach in the form of analytical eclecticism, which effectively 
incorporates “elements drawn from three different styles of analysis – the testing of 
alternative explanations, the rendering of synthetic accounts, and historically informed 
narratives” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2008: 3). One of the early attempts to carry out such 
examination in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance was carried out by Izumikawa 
(2010), who embraced the blending of realist notions of “entrapment” and constructivist 




Chapter II. Methodology  
 
Research questions and theoretical expectations 
The overarching research questions, derived as much from the existing 
literature as from the increasing salience of the issue in the real world settings, are: a) 
how the mere existence and shifting magnitude of an external threat, on a par with the 
strategic triangle theory, affects the equilibrium of entrapment-abandonment tradeoffs; 
b) in what manner allies choose to solve the intensified security dilemma, and what 
potential reputational costs do such choices cover; c) why asymmetry in capabilities and 
commitments does not necessarily result in increased chances of alliance endurance.  
The sub-topics involve mitigating effects that increased institutionalization and 
formalization of existing agreements have on alliance twin anxieties, and how such 
reassurance in the form of exhibiting deterrent qualities affects lasting reputation and 
future courses of action as chosen by allies. Furthermore, the paper explores whether 
hesitation in the face of the crisis, termed “waffling” strategy, represents fading 
commitments to an ally and how it feeds into increasingly mistrust-driven responses.   
Hence, theoretical expectations are: a) a stronger ally will exhibit a certain 
degree of hesitation in the face of crisis, if it is in any way dependent or has vested 
interests in engaging the threatening state; b) the operation and severity of intra-alliance 
security dilemma will be dependent on the condition, implying an important role of 
reputation for reliability a); c) in line with Morrow’s (1991) theory, asymmetry will be 
treated as having a positive effect on respective durability of security ties, and 
institutionalization will be treated as a sign of willingness to mitigate allied anxieties.   
Research design  
The preferred way forward in this examination of the U.S.-Japan intra-
alliance dynamics is a single-case study, which allows for the selection of a case based 
on interest (Stake, 2005) and/or theoretical reasons (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
The US-Japan alliance, with the Senkaku dispute at its core and China acting as an 
external strategic anchor influencing intra-alliance, neatly fits Yin’s (2002:13, 2009) 
definition of a case as “a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, 
especially when the boundaries between a phenomenon and context are not clear and 
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the researcher has little control over [them]”. Given the broad nature of the “how” and 
“why” research questions, and the existence of “many more variables of interest than 
data points”, the case study develops on the basis of previously established “theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2002: 13-14). Here, the paper 
largely embraces the analytic eclecticism approach, which allows for considerable 
flexibility while also remaining “consistent with an ethos of pragmatism in seeking 
engagement with the world of policy and practice….[formulating] problems that 
are…more closely approximate the messiness and complexity of concrete dilemmas 
facing “real world” actors…[and] exploring these problems [through] complex causal 
stories that extricate, translate and selectively recombine analytic 
components…embedded in competing research traditions (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010: 
1). The chosen case study approach differs significantly from quantitative experiments 
in so far as contextual conditions, stemming from the environment, instead of being 
explicitly delineated and controlled for, form a major “part of the investigation” 
(Ridder, 2017: 282). This effectively suggests that case study research entails a largely 
descriptive element resurfacing throughout the examination of a certain phenomenon 
“such as a program, an institution, a person, a process, or a social unit” (Merriam, 1998: 
xiii). More specifically, this particular study draws inspiration from the |unique 
distinctive attributes” singled out by Merriam (1998), namely particularism in case 
focus, thick description of the phenomenon, heuristic approach, which appropriately 
illuminates the understanding of a case under examination.  
Furthermore, this study will adhere as much as possible to Stake’s (2005) 
identified three characteristics of fruitful qualitative case study-based inquiry: holistic 
approach, which takes into account the interactions between the phenomenon and its 
external environment, empirical examination, and interpretative means of arriving to 
conclusions. To be more precise, the investigation of the U.S.-Japan alliance ties  
proceeds in a manner deemed to be of “maximum instrumentality” for answering the 
proposed research questions in a “logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a 
study's initial research questions and, ultimately, to its conclusions” (Yin, 2002:  20).  
Even more so, on a par with Yinian tradition, the thesis first reviews relevant literature 
and derives certain theoretical expectations from it, and in doing so, distinguishes itself 
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from” such methodologies as grounded theory and ethnography“ (Yazan, 2015: 140). 
Hence, this examination dismisses the overly flexible Parlett and Hamilton’s (1972) 
approach based on “progressive focusing”, meaning that the course of the study is not 
being “charted in advance”, restricted by timelines or embedded in existing literature 
review (as cited in Stake, 1995: 22). This study, however, chooses to bind the empirical 
examination by a time frame, which is rather fluid in its nature. More specifically, the 
investigation, while focusing on the developments starting with 2010, will also place the 
recent occurrences into a wider context provided by inquiry into events tracing back to 
1971.  
Notably, even given that the paper does not proceed on the basis of strictly 
delineated hypotheses, it becomes rather evident that the dependent variable in this 
investigation is alliance durability, while the existence and intensification of an external 
threat is treated as an independent condition. Other variables, such as fears of 
abandonment and entrapment, are awarded the status of intervening effect-maximizing 
conditions. Overall, the major shortfall of such approach is the decreased likelihood of 
establishing explicit causal connections. Instead, this method allows generating 
correlations and associations between closely intertwined variables. In other words, the 
extensive grasp of this approach comes at the expense of generating accurate causal 
relationships 
Sources  
It becomes rather clear that the study will draw inspiration from constructivist 
epistemology. Hence, the chosen sources and methods of investigation stand as largely 
qualitative in their nature. More specifically, the case study will rely on the following 
sources, which Yin’s (2002: 96) treats as sufficiently evidentiary : public statements of 
security and defense community representatives, press releases entailing comments 
made by key officials of the U.S. and Japan, media outlets entailing voiced opinions of 
military professionals and academics, secondary sources, which involve readily 
conducted interviews with key authorities in the field of foreign and security policies, 
primary sources in the form of Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Ministry of 
Defense (MOD) reports, White Papers for Defense, and the comparative investigation 





One of the major methodological limitations from which this study suffers is 
heavy reliance on secondary, primarily media and interviews conducted by native 
language speakers, sources in the context of examination of Japanese policymakers’ 
views on a wide range of matters relating alliance politics. In other words, the major 
shortcoming is constituted by inability to appraise existing primary sources due to 
language barrier. This is somewhat mitigated by the increasing tendency among 
Japanese institutions (MOD and MOFA) and media outlets (largely Japan Times) to 
present information regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance in an English version too. On the 
top of that, placing an overly excessive focus on rhetoric of policymakers can 
effectively distort the overall picture of phenomenon under examination.  
Additional impediment is based on the inherent lack of generalizable quality 
of single-case studies. Not only is this study preoccupied with dynamics within a single 
alliance; it also restricts itself to a relatively narrow period of examination, with a 
salient issue at its core. This arguably makes such study results applicable to the future 
behaviour only of this particular alliance.  
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Chapter III. Case study: the U.S.-Japan alliance 
The nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance as an anchor of regional stability  
Given that the nature and existing structure of a particular alliance is 
perceived as one of the explanatory factors for its durability by Walt (1987), and the 
balance towards symmetry or asymmetry serves as a means to assess the likelihood of 
intra-alliance security dilemma severity by Snyder (1984), it is useful to look at the 
original configurations of the U.S.-Japan security liaisons.  From the very beginning, 
with the signing of the 1951 Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan, and 
the 1960 revision of ʺTreaty of Mutual Cooperation between Japan and the United 
Statesʺ, the security partnership was solidified, on the basis of restricting Japan’s 









This clearly illustrates not only the fact of unequal distribution of 
capabilities and commitments, but also the accompanying desirability of such mutually 
beneficial security arrangement. In other words, Japan rested comfortably restricted in 
its military ambitions “under [U.S.’s] nuclear umbrella”, which was effectively 
preventing Japan from “potentially remilitarizing” and in so doing easing China’s 
anxieties about being attacked “out of the blue” (Green, 2008). This deliberate and 
voluntary establishment of asymmetry in a relationship invites questions if attempts to 
revoke it may possess such a detrimental effect as expected by theorists such as Morrow 
(1991). In fact, in the context of intra-alliance security dilemma, Teraoka (2015) cites 
multiple reasons why throughout the existence of this alliance, it was inconceivable for 
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Japan to trigger substantial entrapment fears among the US policy makers: a) its almost 
exclusive focus on economic growth; b) deeply socially and constitutionally ingrained 
pacifism which eradicated all ambitions of remilitarization.  
However, frequently termed the “anchor for regional stability” (Bisley, 
2008, MOD, 2005), the alliance have witnessed both externally and internally-triggered 
disturbances.   Calder (2010: 21-22) asserts that the unusual durability of this alliance “ 
should bot lead us to wallow…in the dangerous swamp of self-congratulation”. More 
specifically, the 1951 Treaty and the following revisions and additions, have 
demonstrated the lack of bargaining power on the part of Japan, desperately trying to 
avoid entrapment in real and expected US adventurism abroad.  Even more so, the 
strategic logic in which the alliance has been embedded for decades is eroding, with the 
domestic context presenting the allies with “complex and intractable” difficulties, such 
as “protracted Futenma mess”, resulting in conspicuous legitimacy problem inherent in 
quid pro quo interactions, backed by the “corrosive” resentment triggered among locals 
in Okinawa in the face of sexual violence assaults conducted by American troops (The 
Japan Times, 2008, CFR Smith, 2013). Notably, these stand as alliance cohesion 
disruptors which largely feed on domestic disturbances; there are also structural 






China-U.S.-Japan triangle: disrupted cohesion in the levels of concern? 
“[T]actics which promote the common interest in one 
game will tend to undermine the common interest in the 
other. Hence, when adversaries compromise their disputes 
in order to reduce tension, the solidarity of their alliances 




The first and perhaps most volatile relationship in the China-US-Japan 
strategic triangle is the Sino-Japanese liaison, perpetually confronting many contentious 
issues, what in turn, sets the stage “for a struggle between a mature power [Japan] and a 
rising one [China]” (Calder, 2006: 129). Admittedly, in order to achieve a thorough 
appreciation of the complexity of Sino-Japanese ties and identities these states awards 
to each other, as a relic of past grievances and resulting mistrust, one would have to 
conduct a more detailed analysis, extending beyond the scope of this paper, and based 
on the toolset provided largely by constructivist school of thought. Rather, this paper 
will adhere closely to the recent developments in Japanese foreign policy community, in 
the context of tensions over the disputed Senkaku islands. 
In the recent defense thinking of Japanese policy makers, a shift from 
perception of China as a competitor in trade-related matter towards being labelled as a 
threatening assertive actor, appears to be rather straightforward and consensus-based, 
extensively acknowledged throughout the political rhetoric of Abe administration and 
meticulously examined in major defense white papers, starting from 2010 (The 
Guardian, 2015). For instance, 2016 Report on Statistics on Scrambles Through Fiscal 
Year 2016, demonstrates that the objective threat to Japan’s territorial integrity is 
stemming precisely from China, which, according to Green (2006), uses the dispute as 
an element to its wedging strategy, aimed at isolating and delegitimizing Japan as too 
reckless of an ally for the U.S. to effectively rely on (MOFA, 2017). Furthermore, 
according to 2013 report compiled by specialists at Carnegie Endowment for 
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 Calder, K. (2006). China and Japan's Simmering Rivalry. [online] Foreign Affairs. Available at: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2006-03-01/china-and-japans-simmering-rivalry [Accessed 
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International Peace (CEIP), Japanese decision-makers have grown increasingly 
concerned over “the increased tempo of Chinese air and naval activity in the East China 
Sea”, seeing it as a representation of emerging confidence among Chinese “in light of 
Japan’s objectively long strategic decline” (CEIP, 2013: 115-116). Even more so, China 
is being perceived as a deliberate disruptor of the U.S.-Japan allied cohesion, attempting 
to escalate tensions and “unilaterally change the status quo by force” (MOD, 2017: 
101). Interestingly, interviews with Japanese security thinkers conducted by Guran in 
2008 already explicitly illustrate gradual growth in Japanese anxieties and prevalent 
tendencies to identify China as a “potential threat”. On the top of that, the reluctance on 
the part of the U.S. to label China as a treat to its national security and, instead, 
choosing to treat it as a competitor with “common cause” (Financial Times, 2015) came 
across as a worrisome sign for the Japanese, further illustrated by the general 
disproportion in the amounts of attention paid to the issue of alliance management in 
2010 National Security Strategy of the United States as compared to Japan’s White 
Defense Papers, constantly dedicating elaborate separate sections to the importance of 








The U.S. abandonment by establishing condominium: Rebalance and Chimerica
25
 
Any examination of intra-alliance security dilemma requires taking into 
account the existing liaison the members to an alliance have established with the 
perceived adversary. In the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the status, although to a 
differing extent, is carried by China. In 2003, the U.S.-China trade had surpassed the 
U.S.-Japan trade in value terms (Calder, 2010: 22), this represented a broader trend of 
increased interdependence of Sino-American ties, with Buzan (2003) confidently 
contending that  the evolution of this liaison stands as a defining feature of future 
courses in the security architecture of North-East Asia.   
Notably, the most recent (re) opening of a “strategic dialogue” 
between Washington and Beijing, or the advent of the political “G2”26 coupled with 
intrinsic economic liaison, termed “Chimerica marriage”, moderately resembles the 
1971-72 warming of U.S.-China relationship, as illustrated by “ping-pong diplomacy” 
and 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, whereby: 
“The two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social 
systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of 
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, 
non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence”(cited in Embassy of the People’s Republic 
of China in the United States of America, February 1978, 1972) 
This normalization of Sino-American ties had come at the expense of the Japanese fears 
of being abandoned as the U.S. prioritized ally in the region, as acknowledged by 
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President Nixon and Walter McConaughy during the phone conversation, where 
McConaughy expressed concerns about the Japanese being “greatly concerned”, and 
Nixon repeatedly reasserting the necessity of cooperation with China by stating that the 
U.S. allies “must be prepared for the fact, that there will continue to be a step-by-step, a 
more normal relationship with the other—the Chinese mainland. Because our interests 
require it. Not because we love them, but because they're there."
27
  
In a rather harsh manner, Silver (CFR, 2000: 11-12) insists that Japan “was 
chagrined” with Washington’s “leapfrogging” of Tokyo by secretly initiating Sino-
American rapprochement, and this fear of being “blindsided and leapfrogged have 
resurfaced from time to time since 1972 in reaction to the twists and turns in U.S.-China 
relation”. This continuity in Japanese relative mistrust can also be illustrated by the 
expected wariness that Japan would exhibit if the U.S. attempts to “secure future 
stability with Beijing in a bilateral treaty to regulate regional BMD activity based on 
mutual vulnerability” (McNamara, 2016: 18-19). It is worth noting, that Japanese 
anxieties about the U.S. embarking on a journey of establishing a type of condominium 
with China previously occurred in the light of warming Sino-Japanese relationship, 
marked by the signing of 1978, August 12, peace and friendship treaty, which 
temporarily put Senkaku island issue aside, representing one of high points in the 
liaison. The agreement was shortly followed by the first notable rearrangement and 
formalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance ties in the form of the 1978, November 27, 
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, towards a more committed U.S. and 
less entrapped Japan.  Overall, the unexpected nature and secrecy of 1971 Kissinger’s 
visit has affected Washington’s reputation for reliability, which therefore was 
repeatedly translating into abandonment anxieties among the Japanese policy makers, 
embedded in efforts to preemptively accommodate the perceived adversary
28
 and 
pressing necessity to revise, clarify and formalize implicitly held alliance obligations.   
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 136. Conversation Between President Nixon and the Ambassador to the Republic of China 
(McConaughy), availabe at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d136  
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 Notably, during the Cold War, there was little disagreement over which state constitutes the strategic 
challenge to the alliance, it was USSR mutually perceived as a threat throughout security papers and 
 rhetoric of the time.
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On a related note, it is quite revealing that Japanese were exhibiting 
concerns about American intentions during the Cold War period, characterized by 
bipolarity with USSR as a strategic anchor for the U.S. “hub and spoke” alliance 
system, and the severity of intra-alliance security dilemma suppressed by structure: lack 
of realignment opportunities, genuine Chinese fears about Japanese remilitarization, and 
a strong U.S. interest in keeping Japan from falling into the Communist sphere of 
influence
29
.   
This “Cold War” relic appears to be, to a certain extent, carried into the 21st 
century East Asian security order, with China gradually replacing USSR as a strategic 
rationale for reinvigorating the U.S.-Japan security ties, and “the often precarious 
balance the U.S. must seek to strike between its partnership with China and its alliance 
with Japan” (McNamara, 2016:16). More specifically, with the Obama’s pivot, later, as 
a damage repair, termed rebalance policy, marking recognition of the U.S.’s future 
being entangled with Asia’s future, came two reluctantly compatible policy trajectories: 
strengthening and reinvigorating regional alliances while also treating the “forging [of] 
a constructive and productive relationship with China… [as] an essential element” of 
the regional stabilizing efforts (Donilon, 2014: 3,6-7). Interestingly, Christensen 
(Foreign Affairs, 2015), states that using the term “pivot” as a representation of 
embarking on deeper engagement in Asia region was not only incorrect, given that 
policies attributable to this “pivoting”, such as “sending more submarines to Guam, 
rotating F-22 aircraft through Japan, sending littoral combat ships to Singapore, entering 
a free-trade pact with South Korea, and negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership” were 
initiated not by the Obama administration, but this “overly muscular language… fed 
into Chinese conspiracy theories about alleged U.S. containment and encirclement”. 
Even more ironically, this “linguistic stumble” invited anxieties on the part of the U.S. 
allies as well, fearing that, if the situation where the U.S. will be forced to deal with two 
or more issues simultaneously, “pivoting away” or, abandonment, will be considered as 
a natural course of action (Christensen, FA, 2015).  These fears were further escalated 
by the November 17, 2009 U.S.-China Joint Statement in Beijing, whereby: 
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“The two countries reiterated that the fundamental principle of 
respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is at 
the core of the three U.S.-China joint communiqués which guide 
U.S.-China relations.  Neither side supports any attempts by any 
force to undermine this principle.  The two sides agreed that 
respecting each other’s core interests is extremely important to 
ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations.(The White House, 
Office of the Press Secretary, November 17, 2009” 
At a first glance, the overall amicable and reassuring nature of the statement 
does not seem as constituting a legitimate basis for concern on the part of the U.S.’s 
allies and partners in the region. Yet, the specific wording of the document, namely the 
embracement of each other’s core interests, triggered fears in Japan of being “eclipsed 
by China” and generated an “overwhelmingly pessimistic [attitude towards]… the 
future”, according to an American political scientist, Andrew Oros (BBC).  Given that 
issue-spheres of sovereignty and territoriality, such as Taiwan, have been considered as 
falling into the zone of China’s core interests, the increased anxiety on the part of Japan 
can be treated as sufficiently warranted (Swaine, 2011). In fact, in 2013, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying has clarified that “[t]he Diaoyu Islands 
are about sovereignty and territorial integrity. Of course, it’s China’s core interest” (The 
Japan Times, April 27, 2013). Not only does this expose the Chinese unwillingness to 
grant concessions over the dispute, but it also shows considerable sloppiness on the part 
of Washington, failing to anticipate Chinese incorporation of isle disputes under the 
“core interest umbrella”, and the resulting confusion-triggered abandonment anxiety in 
Tokyo, reflected in the deteriorating confidence that  “the rise of U.S.-China relations 
does not come at the expense of the U.S.-Japan relationship” (interview-based 
workshops, conducted by Center for American Progress, March 17, 2017). What made 
matters worse, is China referring to this mutual commitment as establishing an 
“important consensus”,  on the basis of which it can place “demands that Washington 
alter its behavior in a variety of areas, from arms sales to Taiwan to presidential 
meetings with the Dalai Lama” (Swaine, 2011: 6-7, Taipei Times, January 22, 2011). 
Yet, early in 2010, the Obama administration has proceeded on the basis of traditional 
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policy approach rooted in country’s “legal, moral, and strategic principles“: promotion 
of Internet freedom, and selling defense arms to Taiwan, to name a few (Christensen, 
2011:3), and realizing the unrealistic expectations the 2009 Statement has fueled among 
the Chinese, also purposefully omitted the contentious phrase in the 2011 joint 
statement following the Hu Jintao’s state visit to Washington (Swaine, 2011: 7). 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the U.S. allies, the statement did stand as a sign of 
“undue weakness”, to the extent it was “acceding to…Beijing’s claim to…supposed 
territorial ambitions”, and “asking of China [almost everything that] directly in the 
interests of the PRC itself“ (Swaine, 2011: 7, Christensen, 2011: 2-3).  
The U.S. abandonment by relapse into uncertain isolationism: Trump as a “wild 
card” 
 
With the arrival of the Trump administration, in 2016, with the largely 
forgotten questions about American relapse into isolationism at its core, have invited 
concerns about the U.S.-Japan alliance being threatened by its principal architect. As 
with 1972 rapprochement with China, this situation carries analogies derived from the 
European context, illustrated by Snyder (1984: 495), with European states finding it 
“conceivable, that The U.S., disillusioned with European obstinacy” will choose the 
path to hemispheric isolation. This further serves as an empirical backing for Jervis’s 
(1976: 168) assertion that the devaluation of alliance value might effectively come with  
the changing leadership, which cannot be overly vigorously bound to the paths chosen 
by predecessors : “minds can be changed…values can shift”, what triggers security 
dilemma triggered by fear, acquiring a life of its own.   
Needless to say, Trump’s accession to the presidency of the U.S. came with 
anxieties on the part of Japanese leaders, carefully observing Trump’s statements and 
social media activity. What became rather evident from a closer look at Trump’s tweets 
over time, is the fact that the U.S. increasing focus on trade might come at the expense 
of ensuring Japan’s security: “The Trans-Pacific Partnership is an attack on America's 
business. It does not stop Japan's currency manipulation. This is a bad deal” 
(@realDonaldTrump, 22 Apr 2015). The following termination of TPP, which was 
supposed to be a cementing agent of the U.S.-Japan cooperation, was met with 
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increasing calls for reassurances on the part of Japan, which manifested in Abe’s 
eagerness to meet Trump in informal setting, what in the context of the UK is referred 
to as “washing dirty linen in private” (Trench, 2009). Even more so, Trump’s focus on 
transactional nature of interactions between states and the resulting focus on partners 
which offer most beneficial conditions for the U.S. economy to prosper, was 
complemented by the “America First” policy with regards to alliance commitments as 
well. More specifically, this policy, as a clear representation of unwillingness to get 
entangled over the conflicts the U.S. has no interests in, entailed both direct and implicit 
calls for the U.S. allies in Asia to develop their own nuclear strike capabilities, since 
maintaining “nuclear umbrella” over the region occupied by free-riders, was considered 
too costly of a strategy by Trump.  And even though Trump has retreated from his 
initial position and initiated negotiations over a new trade deal with Japan, “numerous 
recent trips by high-ranking U.S. officials — including the secretary of defense, 
secretary of state and vice president — have reinforced the view that Tokyo remains 
shaken by the experience” (The Japan Times, April 26,  2017). 
Nevertheless, what further complicates the U.S.-Japan alliance coherence in 
the age of Trump is an increasing recognition that tacking of North Korean threat 
requires a closer engagement with China, which can exert significant pressure in 
constraining North Korean nuclear adventurism. Despite the alleged ascent of trade 
wars between the U.S. and China, the two countries have engaged in constructive 
dialogue regarding trade most recently, on May 17 and 18 (Eurasia Future, May 19, 
2018). Perhaps triggered by Trump shifting focus away from Japanese concerns towards 
prioritizing development or fruitful relationship with Chinese, Japan faced “particularly 
bruising few days…scrambling to remain diplomatically relevant” in the face of 
Trump’s decision to accept North Korea’s invitation for a personal meeting. And 
despite the following imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs on Japan, Abe has 
promptly announced that he will visit Trump as soon as possible.  Daniel Sneider, a 
lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, closely observing the recent 
evolution of the American-Japanese ties, has concluded:   
“You feel compelled immediately upon the news about the 
meetings with the North Koreans to go rush off to Washington in 
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order to reassure yourself? That’s interesting...It means that it’s 
a kind of relationship that requires that kind of constant shoring 




Chapter IV. A case study within a case study: Senkaku/Diaoyu island 
dispute
30
 as a litmus
31




 The issue of disputed sovereignty with regards to Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands in the East China Sea has plagued not only the bilateral Sino-Japanese 
relationship, but also the broader regional security architecture for decades, with its 
origins as a resource competition rather than a territoriality dispute. This heightened 
interest in the islands of course has little to do with the land itself; what both countries
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find particularly attractive is the surrounding waters, extensive natural resources within 
the economic zone, and, more generally, ability to control the sea routes.   Essentially, 
both states present what they believe are well-justified and legitimate claims to the land, 
with Japan tracing the legality of its claim to 1971 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, whereby 
the U.S., being in charge of the administration of the islands since 1953, has transferred 
the respective rights to Japan, with the monitoring of effective control handled by the 
Japanese Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) (Wiegand, 2009: 172). Following the signing 
of the reversion treaty, China’s Foreign Ministry made formal claims to the islands 
resting on the fact that the lands have formed a part of China’s sovereign territory since 
15
th
 century, and any Japanese attempt to assert control over the islands would 
constitute “usurped ownership” (ibid.). However, it is worthy of note that the issue did 
not hamper significantly and was effectively put aside for a time being in the context of 
Japan’s “accelerated engagement with China following the Sino-U.S. rapprochement of 
1972” (Hughes, 2009: 839). 
Notoriously hard to settle bilaterally, whether due to China’s “dual 
strategy of issue linkage and coercive diplomacy” (Wiegand, 2009: 171) or “unresolved 
historical grievances and the politics  of national identity” (Valencia, 2007: 157), the 
dispute often produces severe clashes, which, while not qualifying as an open “war”, do 
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with Japan fearing to be entrapped in an unnecessary conflict 
31 Terminology adopted from Carl Bildt’s (1994) examination of “The Baltic Litmus Test” 
32 A very detailed analysis of the legitimate claims to the island is presented available at:  
https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/ryodo_eg/img/data/archives-senkaku03.pdf  
 33 Admittedly, Taiwan also has claims to the disputed islands, which it calls Taioyutai Islands.
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fall into the gray zone category of military confrontation. The “Uotsurijima lighthouse 
dispute” stands as one of the best illustrations of the fragility of intra-conflict 
relationship between these two states, whereby, in response to Japan’s ratification of the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996 (granting Japan the right to enforce 
Exclusive Economic Zone), Japanese nationalist activists have built a lighthouse 
structure as a symbol of asserting state’s sovereignty over the islands. In turn, this has 
invited harsh responses from Chinese Foreign Ministry, accusing Japan of revival in 
militarism and linking the lighthouse incident to  Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto 
visiting Yasukuni Shrine, and the denial of Nanking atrocities of 1937, which taken 
together appeared to Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang as a valid justification 
for deploying two submarines to the islands: “[a]ll these [events] added up to giving a 
green light to these actions and remarks of the Japanese right wing groups…[which] are 
not accidental and directly related to the attitude of the Japanese government” (cited in 
Wiegand, 2009: 183; Associated Press, August 29, 1996;  Kyodo News Service, August 
29, 1996; Jiji Press, September 10, 1996). Interestingly, Taiwan went as far as 
considering a “secret plan” of deploying “elite troops on Senkakus to destroy the 
lighthouse” (Asahi Shimbun, 5 December 2012)34.  
Despite the clearly evident tensions and fractures in Sino-Japanese 
relationship since the advent of this issue, China’s approach to the matter is considered 
as quite low-key prior to 2010 (Fravel, 2016). Indeed, rapid escalations followed the 
2010 incident of collision between Chinese fishing boat and Japanese coastguard ships, 
with China Daily, a newspaper run by  Publicity Department of the Communist Party 
of China, reporting: 
 “A wave of indignation is brewing in Chinese society, 
which might snowball into a major public outcry if the 
Japanese authorities continue to take a hardline stance" 
(cited in The Guardian, September 9, 2010). 
                                                          
34
 Overall, the perpetual cycle of confrontations, the inherent inextricability of the issue, and the issue 
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(2008) narrative of an assertive enemy being the result of vague alliance commitments or the symptom of 
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The bilateral relationship, plummeting to its “lowest point in years”, has 
experienced yet another setback caused by 2012 purchase of 3 islands in the chain, 
under the auspices of the so-called “the outspoken and hawkish” Ishihara’s plan, at the 
bottom of which lies an attempt to protect Japanese territory, and whether China accepts 
it as a legitimate course of action or not is irrelevant (The Japan Times, April 18, 2012).  
Unsurprisingly, the decision has invited yet another wave of stark criticisms, 
accusations of stealth and “a show of strength” in the form of sending “maritime law 
enforcement ships” to the disputed area (The New York Times, September 11, 2012), 
revealing, according to Fravel (2016), China’s “relatively weak position”.  
In November 2013, the situation has escalated further, with China 
declaring Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) supposedly covering Senkakus, 
termed as a “Fourth Wall in the Sky”, as a “necessary measure taken by China in 
exercising its self-defense right...not directed against any specific country or target“ 
(Ministry of National Defense of PRC, 2013, as cited in Brookings,  December 17, 
2013). Despite this somewhat vague reassurance, the chances of a potential clash 
between these powers seemed to have skyrocketed, with China’s actions viewed by a 
senior U.S. intelligence officer, Captain James Fanell, as a preparation for “short, sharp 
war to destroy Japanese forces in the East China Sea, followed with what can only be 
expected, a seizure of the Senkakus or even the southern Ryukyus” (Brookings, 
February 25, 2014). Responding to this measure and Chinese self-proclaimed rights to 
enforce it, Japan insisted that such act constitutes an unacceptable unilateral effort to 
“change the status quo in the East China Sea, escalating the situation, and that may 
cause unintended consequences”35. Kerry mirrored Japanese concern about alteration of 
status quo
36, and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel reaffirmed that “this announcement 
by the People's Republic of China will not in any way change how the United States 
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 MOFA Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (of Japan) on the announcement on the ‘East 
China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone’ by the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic 
of China,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available at: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000098.html 
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44 
 
conducts military operations in the region… The United States reaffirms its 
longstanding policy that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to 
the Senkaku Islands”37.  Further U.S.-Japanese security relationship regarding the issue 
of Senkaku islands was developing against this background of intractable tensions.  
Pressing dilemma of response: distancing through the strategy of inaction? 
“Japan feels isolated, and cannot understand why Washington 
remains neutral over this sovereignty dispute. Japan has a point. The 
United States has dined out on a neutral stance — falling back on 
apathy toward the outcomes of territorial disputes throughout Asia, as 
long as they are "resolved peacefully" — for a long time” (Foreign 
Policy,  October 31, 2012). 
Given that the confrontations taking place around the issue of Senkaku 
islands did not comfortably qualify for the status and ramifications carried by direct 
attack or declaration of war, naturally, there was a considerable amount of strategic 
ambiguity followed by emerging mistrust after the incident. Jennifer Lind, associate 
professor of government at Dartmouth College, states that: 
 “Senkaku dispute represents “an area where we see a really 
fascinating transformation in the alliance dynamic, where 
there’s been a complete swing in the fear of entrapment…[f]or 
sixty years, the Japanese were afraid that we would drag them 
into a war. Now, we have the opposite problem in the 
Diaoyu/Senkakus.” (Council on Foreign Relations, July 1, 
2014) 
Snyder’s (1990: 114) warning that any advantageous situation in the 
entrapment-abandonment balance “must not be exploited too vigorously”, due to its 
degrading influence on alliance solidarity, stands as particularly relevant in this context. 
First and foremost, the fact that up until 2014, four years after the commencement of 
rapidly escalating tensions, there was no explicit statement on the part of the US 
leadership does point to the direction of escalating severity in intra-alliance security 
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dilemma. The transitional period itself is defined as “puzzling silence” by Teraoka 
(2015), with a worrisome inconsistency in “both public and private statements made by 
top U.S. government and military officials on this issue from 1996 to 2014” (2015: 79). 
The summary of these conversations reveal that the application of Article V
38
 to the 
Senkaku contingency was seriously considered for the first time only in September, 
2012 by Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense under Obama Administration, in the 
Remarks with Japanese Minister of Defense. And perhaps more strikingly, as Teraoka 
(2015: 89) there was no mentioning of this contingency and its ramifications for the 
U.S. security and Asia strategy during throughout the official statement accompanying 
2013 National Defense Authorization Act before the US Senate.  Yet, this is where the 
focus solely on public speeches would render incomplete results and flawed 
conclusions, because the act itself, under Section 1286, Sense of Congress on the 
Situation in the Senkaku Islands, explicitly defined the US position on the matter, 
stating that: “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ 
acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands; the United 
States...opposes efforts at coercion, the threat of use of force, or use of force by any 
claimant in seeking to resolve sovereignty and territorial issues in the East China Sea; 
and, the United States reaffirms its commitment to the Government of Japan under 
Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security”  (U.S. Congress, 126 
STAT. 2040). While this does not necessarily mean that Barack Obama himself has 
embraced such interpretation of the Senkaku dispute, it does give a sense of a general 
direction what the U.S. strategic policy was shifting towards, which was a policy of 
strict adherence to the guidelines and the defense treaty regulating its bilateral 
relationship with Japan.  
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Nevertheless, a firm and somewhat reassuring stance for the first time 
was taken by Joe Biden in his meeting with Abe Shinzo in March, 2013, whereby Vice 
President has “delivered a carefully calibrated show of support…stopping short of a 
demand that Beijing reverse itself…[in] a dispute [the U.S.] wishes neither to mediate 
nor to see escalate” (The New York Times, December 3, 2013). However, on December 
4, The White House, Office of the Vice President, released a report on Remarks by Vice 
President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping of the People's Republic of China, in 
which Senkaku issue was completely and perhaps deliberately omitted, given that the 
focus of the talks was revolving around the revival of the Sino-American ties: 
 “The relationship that you and President Obama have 
established thus far is full of promise and real opportunity for 
us.  If we get this relationship right, engender a new model, the 
possibilities are limitless” (Biden, 2013). 
This inconsistency in assurance statements and the overwhelming 
reluctance to recognize the severity of the issue for Japan’s security can be partially 
attributable to the gap in threat perception. It became apparent from Biden’s statements 
that, at the time, China was being perceived by the U.S. more as a potential partner, 
rather than an assertive adversary actively threatening status quo in East-Asia region 
(the White House, December 4, 2013). Interestingly, one of the first oppositions to 
China’s actions undermining Japan’s administrative control of the disputed islands, 
which was not followed by any assertions of importance of maintaining good 
relationship with China in parallel, came on January 18, 2013, from Secretary of State, 
Hillary Clinton
39
.  This constituted one of the earliest attempts to reinvigorate the U.S. 
diplomacy
40
, facing troubles in scurrying “to get ahead of and influence, rather than 
simply reacting to and exercising damage control toward, the escalating dangers of the 
Japan-China dispute, drawing “an immediate, furious protest in Beijing” (Forbes, 
February 7, 2013). However, Stephen Harner perceives such statements as “unfortunate 
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mistakes” and a form of “cheap talk” to mitigate Tokyo’s misperceptions and delusions 
that the U.S. “reciprocates” the priority that Japan attaches to the U.S. as an ally, while 
in reality it is “G2” relationship that the U.S. is reluctant to “compromise or endanger” 
(ibid.). Hugh White, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University 
in Canberra, goes as far as suggesting that the Obama administration reluctance and 
ambivalence offers China “a window of opportunity… to stage a clash over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which [would be reduced or deterred only] if [U.S. 
statements]…[carry] real credibility” (The National Interest, July 15, 2014).  As a 
matter of fact, faced with Japanese concerns over a scenario of surprise Chinese 
invasion, Philip Crowley, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, via 
teleconference has responded that “we do not envision that this current tension will rise 
to that level in any foreseeable scenario”, while also trying to refrain from the question 
if “the U.S.-Japan defense treaty covering the Senkaku Islands”41. 
Undoubtedly this stands as a complicating factor for maintaining 
credibility, further intensified by the fact that most of the US’s public statements were 
largely “reactive” to exerted pressures by Japanese officials and policymakers. This 
points to the hesitation or “waffling” strategy as a deliberate attempt to avoid 
responsibility, since “[m]aking statements voluntarily is an indication of how willing a 
government is to demonstrate its commitment” (Teraoka, 2015: 80). Nevertheless, in 
April, 2014, the U.S. President Barack Obama has ultimately issued a statement at a 
joint press conference following the summit at the State Guest House in the Akasaka 
district: 
“Let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is 
absolute. And Article 5 (of the treaty) covers all territories under 
Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands… We share a 
concern about China’s land reclamation and construction activities in 
the South China Sea, and the United States and Japan are united in 
our commitment[s]” (The Japan Times, April 24, 2014, The White 
House Office of the Press Secretary, April 28, 2015).  
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Nevertheless, it was also continuously stressed that the U.S. refuses to 
take a position on the question of Senkaku’s sovereignty, and that China remains “a 
critical country…[with] enormous opportunities for trade, development, working on 
common issues, like climate change” (The Japan Times, April 24, 2014). In a similar 
manner as Biden, Obama insisted that his statement does not depart from the positions 
of past administrations, and this “standard interpretation” should not be viewed as 
“drawing [new] red lines” over the Senkaku issue (ibid.). This “double-speak” rhetoric, 
termed as “contradictory” and instilling “a sense of skepticism in Japan”, did little to 
reassure Tokyo, especially in the face of “Obama’s conspicuous inaction and silence on 
China’s 2012 seizure of the disputed Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, despite 
America’s long-standing mutual defense treaty with Manila”. Such circumstances fit 
neatly into Gibler’s (2008: 433) contention that “disreputable partners” are largely 
unable to “provide credible signals capable of deterring” aggressive behaviour against 
“their protégés”.  
Furthermore, addressing the issue of timing, it is worth noting that, while 
carefully tailored to mitigate Japanese anxieties without risking to endanger far-reaching 
benefits of closer cooperation with China, the statement did little to tackle the 
uneasiness among Japanese policymakers, further enhanced by the fact that the 
recognition of Senkaku’s salience took place not in the immediate aftermath of 
belligerent actions, but rather as a “linking” issue in Obama’s effort to reach an 
agreement on the trade pact (Trans-Pacific Partnership).  Indeed, the discourse, 
involving calls for reaching the equilibrium with regards to distribution of Japanese and 
American cars, comes across as rather odd against the backdrop of severe security 
concerns experienced by Japan. In fact, one might go as far as inferring that this stands 
as an example of deliberate, yet, implicit  “coercive issue linkage”, with the U.S. 
support in the Senkaku contingency being dependent on the outcomes on the TTP 
negotiations. This implies that the supposed “irrefutability” of this supportive stance, as 
an ultimate determinant of finalized adhesion strategy by the U.S. (Teraoka, 2015), is 
vulnerable in a sense that it draws “inspiration” not from the strict adherence to the 
treaty text itself, but rather from circumstance-driven cost-benefit calculations.  
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The Senkaku tensions were indeed increasing against the background of 
significant improvements and increased communication in Sino-American relationship, 
which rendered Japan “a nervous onlooker with vested interests” (McNamara, 2016: 
16). As mentioned before, a rather similar situation arose in 1972, during the years of 
the Nixon administration and the introduction of rapprochement strategy. Hence, it is 
unsurprising that, in the recent context of very real likelihood of military escalation, 
Japan newly found itself plagued with abandonment anxiety about reliability of its 
closest ally. Hence, the gradual recovery of somewhat amicable Sino-American ties 
partially explains differently perceived levels of urgency within the alliance, with Japan 
being anxious due to the reluctance on the part of the US to offer more than vague 
assurances, and the U.S., resting on the opposite side of the security dilemma spectrum, 
fearing to be entrapped in a conflict not only of a less than moderate importance, but 
also carrying a detrimental value in recently revived cooperation with China. It also 
becomes evident that the U.S. was trying to tackle security dilemmas on both levels, the 
one with a perceived adversary state, and one within the alliance, whereas the 
improvement in one liaison meant a very likely setback in another. The stark 
interconnectedness of “adversary game” and “alliance game” in this context only further 
illustrates, that in order to ensure survival of its alliance system “in geopolitically tense 
regions”, the U.S. has to engage in constant “maintenance” efforts coupled with “highly 





The Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: mitigating  the intra-
alliance security dilemma by increasing the degree of institutionalization 
Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan 
Defense Cooperation, developing in a consistent manner as a response to external 
disturbances (1978 briefly, 1997, 2015), reveals a significant increase in the degrees of 
institutionalization and formalization of alliance ties, while the very fact that such 
guidelines are being negotiated reveal strife for formalization of alliance commitments. 
Such occurrences, in the context of Snyder’s (1984) alliance security theory, signal that 
one party to the security arrangement suffers from anxiety triggered by fears of 
abandonment, whereby further formalization of ties and increased explicitness of the 
agreements serve as a reassurance mechanism.  In practice, Rafferty (2003) throughout 
the extensive examination of bilateral alliances, investigating the 1978 and 1997 
Guidelines in parallel, reveals that, initially, the U.S.-Japan alliance was operating 
largely on the basis of logic of informality and respective minimal institutionalization. 
The overarching purpose of such alliance ties was considered to be the statement of 
intentions, rather than setting the rules for effective military cooperation in the case of 
contingencies (Rafferty, 2003).  From this, it appears to be the case that Rafferty’s study 
somewhat fails to appreciate the gradual development of the formality in the alliance 
obligations. It does, however, establish three measures of institutionalization: 
institutional breadth and institutional depth, and policy coordination (Rafferty, 2003). 
Ikenberry (2001), however, suggests that gradually routinized ties, enhancement of 
cooperation and attaching more value to institutions was indeed taking place in the 
period between the adoption of the two Guidelines (1978, 1997). Here, Ikenberry’s 
study implicitly coincides with Guran’s (2008: 14) conclusion, namely that credible 
institutionalization, which carries a potential to reassure the ally, is “characterised by 
patterned practices and expectations of behaviour [rather] than by formal organisations 
or bureaucratisation”.  
If analyzed against the background of previous Guidelines, the 2015 
edition appears to be considerably more ambitious and threat-oriented, as exemplified 
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by the Interim Report 2013
42
 calling for “seamless, robust, flexible, and effective 
bilateral responses; the global nature of the Japan-U.S. Alliance; cooperation with other 
regional partners; synergy across the two governments’ national security policies; and a 
whole-of-government Alliance approach” (MOFA, 2013:2).   With regards to threat 
dimension, the term “persistent and emerging threats” is used throughout the finalized 
Guidelines continuously (MOFA, 2015). Yet, the threats themselves, China and North 
Korea, while widely discussed in the public realm and media, are not explicitly referred 
to in the Guidelines. Nevertheless, the consistent reference to volatile threat 
environment implies that the strategic anchor acting as alliance “glue” remains the 
existence of an external threat, which shifted from the USSR to China.  
Admittedly, the document does entail “identity and value” dimensions, as 
well as the assertion that the Japan-U.S. alliance is now characterized as having global 
responsibility for peace and that situations threatening peace and security are no longer 
“geographical” in their nature (MOFA, 2015: 7), what stands in a stark contrast to 
previously codified commitments and actions. In fact, due to its profound antimilitarist 
culture and extensive focus on economic development, Japan was extremely cautious in 
defining the scope of its formal commitments to the US, going as far as negotiating the 
exclusion of the term “Pacific” from the previous treaty text (Teraoka, 2015).  While 
this does serve as an illustration of intra-alliance security dilemma, more specifically, 
the fear of entrapment, the particular situation is unique, because it is the weaker ally 
who was plagued with “fierce entrapment fears”, resisting the exerted pressure by the 
U.S. attempting to “get Japan more involved in regional security” and provide support 
for the “U.S. engagement in global conflicts” (Teraoka, 2015: 71).  Importantly, this 
occurrence does not sit well with the theoretical expectations derived from the neorealist 
alliance security dilemma literature.  
Going back to attaching the label of global power for peace through 
engagement in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, Hughes (2007:325-6, 2004) 
remains highly skeptical of the genuine intentions underlying such claims, asserting that 
this display of “a degree of strategic convergence on global security objectives”, as a 
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response to U.S. “expectations for support in the ‘war on terror’”, serves a more 
practical purpose “as a political pretext for legitimating long-planned changes in 
military security policy that are often only marginally related to the U.S.’s anti-terrorism 
agenda”.  On the top of that, Hughes (2017a) contends that Japan’s primary concern is 
to “obviate entrapment in U.S.-Japan alliance commitments” while simultaneously 
ensuring that its focus is “primarily on contingencies involving Japan”. Later on, a 
careful examination of the strategic environment allows him to conclude that Japan is 
choosing a different “security path” altogether with “proactive pacifism” at its core 
(2017a: 126). This is clearly supported by the more explicit commitments stemming 
from the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.  
Indeed, the section D. of the new Guidelines, termed “Actions in 
Response to an Armed Attack against a Country other than Japan” states that Japan 
takes up a responsibility to: 
 “respond to an armed attack against the United States or a 
third country, and Japan has not come under armed attack... 
cooperate closely to respond to the armed attack and to deter 
further attacks. Bilateral responses will be coordinated through 
the whole-of-government Alliance Coordination Mechanism” 
(MOFA, 2015: 15). 
This unprecedented posture of accepting the burden of “fighting 
alongside the United States, with the potentially enhanced risks of direct entrapment in 
contingencies if deterrence fails”, reveals the decline in Japan’s long pursued, hedging 
strategy (Hughes, 2017: 116). Interestingly, since for Snyder (1984: 488) the adoption 
and persistence of a hedging strategy stands for a reflection of entrapment fears by an 
ally, the current developments in the U.S.-Japan security ties, as partially illustrated by 
comparing 1997 and 2015 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, point to the balance of 
fears shifting towards the abandonment anxiety on the part of Japan.  Even more so, this 
revision of the Guidelines stands as a representation of Snyder’s (1984: 474) theoretical 
argument that a further evolution of “a formal, explicit contract” is prompted to serve as 
a complementary mitigating factor aimed at easing abandonment fears triggered by 
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embedded asymmetrical structure of alliance ties.  In this context, through the placing of 
an excessive focus on building bilateral frameworks for defense cooperation
43
, the 
Guidelines appear to suggest that Japan’s national security is being increasingly tied to 
that of the U.S., with invocations of heightened interest indivisibility, implying 
significant shifts in direct and indirect dependence, which, in the context of Snyder’s 
(1984, 1990) theory, stand as indicators of the severity of intra-alliance security 
dilemma, more specifically, expected fears of abandonment and entrapment.  
Another interesting and worthy of mentioning outcome of the 
comparative analysis of 1997 and 2015 Guidelines, is that the latter version does not 
explicitly refer to “limitations” in Japan’s capacity to support the U.S., and changes in 
wording from “[t]he United States will provide appropriate support to Japan... U.S. 
Forces will support Self-Defense Forces... with necessary intelligence, and... the use of 
forces providing additional strike power“ (MOFA, 1997, 3-4), to “the United States, in 
accordance with its own criteria, will provide appropriate support for Japan’s activities” 
and multiple references to “mutual support” as opposed to expectations of one-sided 
support; and Japan’s broadening “support for international activities” (MOFA, 2015: 
17), as opposed to restricted cooperation in “international situations of mutual interest, 
especially in the Asia-Pacific region” (MOFA, 1997: 2). This shows that there are no 
significant shifts in the U.S. lasting focus on ensuring cooperation in the realm of global 
and regional contingencies, while Japan, being largely preoccupied with the security 
environment around itself and the U.S., under the revised Guidelines finds itself as “the 
first responder in any Senkaku contingency” as well as an equal partner to the U.S. in 
conflicts around the world. Here, it is important to note that, while it is tempting to 
assume that such shift in Japan’s role is a result of the public demand or a more general 
shift in identity that is closer and more sensitive towards the U.S.’s world-wide 
commitments, in all likelihood, this transformation of Guidelines being a direct result of 
the Senkaku dispute is fueled by calculation of risks of being abandoned in the face of 
China’s emerging assertiveness. The antimilitarist sentiment and pacifism is still present 
within Japan, and the desirability of the alliance and its forces being stationed on 
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Japanese soil is still low
44
. Hence, the stability in the U.S. posture with no new 
burdensome demands and expectations tied to it, as a resurfacing aspect of the revised 
Guidelines, effectively uncovers Japan’s preoccupation with keeping the U.S. from 
shifting its strategic attention elsewhere. More specifically, there are no changes with 
regards to increasing U.S. commitments and overall firmness, instead, it is Japan who 
undertakes a more proactive role along with expressed willingness to equalize 
contributions to peace and security (MOFA, 2015). This not only implies that Japan’s 
“rediscovered” eagerness to engage in alliance matters, with the U.S. maintaining its 
relatively stable stance, is a sign of anxiety on the part of Japan, but it also points to the 
fact that the revision of Guidelines was, in all likelihood, driven by one-sided concerns 
about the increasing detrimental effects of free-rider reputation.  
This also means that the increased institutionalization of the alliance ties 
is happening not as a response to domestic pressures, even if the recent polls do suggest 
that the perception of China as a threat is increasing in the minds of the public
45
. The 
driving force behind the revision of the Guidelines is the uneasiness about the chances 
of the U.S. withdrawal from an unfairly unbalanced security relationship, and the 
subsequent promise of transforming Japan’s role within the alliance is a reflection of 
Japan’s anxiety of being abandoned in its dealings with the escalating external threat. In 
other words, the evident granting of more autonomy for Japan does not translate into the 
increases in chances of the U.S. being abandoned by its ally; instead, it is largely 
perceived as a way to gradually eradicate the perpetually occurring label of an 
irresponsible “free-rider”, who “doesn’t have to do anything…[but] sit home and watch 
Sony television” (Donald Trump, The National Interest, 2015; the Japan Times 2017).  
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Operationalization of the Guidelines: “putting meat on the bones” 46 or “business 
as usual”? 
“If we cannot defend ourselves [in Central America] …then we cannot 
expect to prevail elsewhere…[O]ur credibility will collapse and our 
alliances will crumble... If Central America were to fall, what would the 
consequences be for our position in Asia and Europe and for alliances 
such as NATO?...Which ally, which friend would trust us then?" 
(Ronald Reagan, New York Times, 28 April 1983) 
Disagreements over terms 
Following the 2015 revision of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, 
the need to achieve tangible operationalization, especially in the gray-zone areas, has 
surfaced. The Japanese could no longer afford reassurances in words and joint 
communiques only; the mere factual replacement of Bilateral Planning Mechanism with 
supposedly more rigorous and “seamless” Alliance Planning Mechanism, which would 
allow for an effective analysis and rapid joint responses to “gray zone” contingencies, 
was not deemed to be sufficient (Foreign Affairs, 2015). Here, it is important to 
highlight that, as CEIP (2013: 116) reports, Japanese decision makers and defense 
planners draw a distinction between direct high-end conflict and “gray zone” 
competition, characterized by increasing Chinese military presence and activities termed 
as being “short of war”.  This is clearly illustrated in the Annual White Paper, Defense 
of Japan 2010, whereby the policymakers agree that “a full-scale invasion against Japan 
that will threaten its existence, such as a large-scale landing invasion, is unlikely to 
occur,” while also remaining cautious of increasingly “diverse, complex and 
intertwined” nature of security challenges in the region (MOD, 2010). On its part, the 
U.S. somewhat failed to recognize the importance of Japanese concerns over “gray 
area” coercion, focusing mostly on scenarios involving “high-end military conflict with 
China” (CEIP, 2013: 116) 
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Joint military operations 
47
 
Apart from this technical disagreement over terms, the actual schemes for 
“greater interoperability between Japan’s Self Defense Forces and the U.S. military, 
especially in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and maritime 
security”, embedded in the revised Guidelines (MOFA, 2015, Foreign Affairs, 2015), 
have been successfully devised as early as January and February 2014, in the form of 
bilateral amphibious military exercises. In particular, the “Iron Fist” exercises, an 
annual bilateral training taking place between Japanese Ground Defense Forces and the 
U.S. Marines, and entailing the dimension of simulated seizure of the disputed islands, 
act not only as a “confidence-building measure or an opportunity to increase 
interoperability”, but also as a signal of a “political will” and “military means” to 
retaliate in the face of potential Chinese aggression (East Asia Forum, July 3, 2014).  
Termed “monthlong war games”, these exercises took place for the last time in January, 
2018, before the launching of Japan’s first full-scale  Amphibious Rapid Deployment 
Brigade “as a part of a sweeping reorganization of its ground force” (The San Diego 
Union-Tribune, January 12, 2018, Defense News, March 28, 2018). The rhetoric 
surrounding these exercises is somewhat revealing too, with Collonel Fridrik 
Fridriksson, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit commander, asserting that “Iron Fist” 
stands as nothing more than a genuine attempt at “trying to improve the Japanese 
amphibious capabilities…[and] showing that we’re an absolute ally, that we’re going to 
stand toe-to-toe and we’ll stand as partners. And that shouldn’t be perceived as anything 
threatening” (The San Diego Union-Tribune, January 12, 2018). However, Toshi 
Yoshihara, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, was 
more outspoken about “Iron Fist”, along with other regular joint trainings and 
demonstrations, being a part of a deliberate deterrence strategy “the goal [of which] is  
to increase the potential pain to Chinese operations to such an extent that the (People’s 
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Liberation Army) would be deterred from rolling the iron dice in the first place” (San 
Diego Union-Tribute, February 5, 2018). The culmination of this exercise has been 
widely perceived as cementing Washington’s alliance commitments to Japan while also 
operationally proving Japan’s reliability as an increasingly autonomous ally (ibid.).  
Other notable examples of consequential military cooperation are 
constituted by operations Keen Sword
48
 and Yaka Sakura. The former one has 
repeatedly demonstrated, according to Captain James McKinney
49
, confident ability and 
willingness to “use the maximum amount of resources available to respond… to 
contingencies”, while the latter has been perceived by both, military strategists and 
policymakers, as “key to building the bilateral relationships and capabilities”, 
recognizing authenticity of Japanese eagerness to invest in continuity of the US-Japan 
relationship (Colonel Charles A. Western, Chief of Staff, 3d MEB
50
), and overall 
“strengthening  [of] Japan-U.S. ties…in this severe security environment” (Minister 
Onodera, MOD, January, 2018). 2018 MultiSail joint training activities also represent 
an opportunity to increase “interoperability between U.S. and Japanese 
forces...[through] improving fundamental skills such as tracking and defeating 
submarines, combatting other surface forces, [and] live fire training“51.  Yet, it is 
important to acknowledge that the commencement and regular execution of some of 
these operations can be traced back to early 2000s, meaning that it would be a crude 
exaggeration to suggest that the very existence of joint trainings is dependent upon 
assertive postures adopted by Japan’s neighbours. While there is an observable 
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expansion and intensification of these interactions, it cannot be solely attributable to the 
rising Chinese threat.  
It is also worth noting, that the timing of the U.S.-Japan bilateral military 
engagement, implicitly aimed at countering Chinese assertiveness, tends to coincide 
with joint missile and air drills (in 2017), which are perceived as direct response to 
North Korean threat (The Japan Times, April 26, 2017). A senior Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute defense analyst, Malcolm Davis, suggests that North Korea’s 
aggressiveness, if viewed in the context of developing Senkaku island dispute, can be 
seen as a breeding ground of unprecedented opportunity for Abe’s administration to 
justify the loosening of constitutional constraints on the exercise of collective defense, 
and in doing so, forge closer “security bonds” with Washington (ibid.). To be more 
precise, Davis offers to approach Japanese eagerness to engage in possible North Korea 
contingencies from an angle of it being a carefully tailored strategy of costly signaling 
of strong loyalty and convergence of strategic regional interests, aimed at “taming” the 
Trump administration (ibid.). Accordingly, this strategy was accompanied by increased 
frequency in high-level dialogues between defense communities on the both sides of the 
Atlantic, routinized meetings followed by sometimes controversial deals aimed at 
expanding the scope of surveillance cooperation
52
 (The Intercept, 2017). Taken 
together, these developments taken separately from the statements by the U.S. officials, 
in their own right, reveal increases in alliance collaborative activities. However, if one 
looks closely at the American rhetoric, it appears to suggest that Japan should be 
prepared to tackle security issues in its surrounding region autonomously, and the joint 
operations serve the purpose of enhancing this capacity, rather than signaling solidarity 
between the allies.   
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Japan’s remilitarization: preemptive abandonment or burden-sharing? 
The revision of the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, credibility 
of the embedded statements of intent and recent joint military exercises cannot be 
decoupled from the efforts on the part of Japan to “normalize” militarily and share ‘the 
“spear” role of offensive capability with the U.S.’ (The Japan Times, May 9, 2017). In 
fact, as Figure 1 illustrates, Japan has been increasing its defense budget consistently 
since 2012, with an observable curve up around 2010. This indicates that there is a 
direct link between the two Senkaku-dispute-related incidents involving China and the 
accumulation of military capabilities.  
Figure 1. Growth in Japan’s defense budget (2000-2018) 
 
 
Source: The Japan Times, 2018 
The increases in defense spending is one of many representations of a considerable 
departure or a “grand strategic shift” from the “Yoshida Doctrine”53, which has 
dominated the strategic thinking and discourse of Japanese leaders during the postwar 
period, towards a more militarized “Abe Doctrine”, which is considered to be an 





inevitable response to international structural changes: “the rise of China and 
uncertainties over U.S. power and commitment” (Hughes, 2017b). More specifically, 
Samuels (2007: 144-146) discovers that adherents to the pragmatic and moderate 
security approach promoted by Yoshida tradition are losing their ground in the domestic 
political settings, in the meantime, Abe is exploiting the hollowness and flexibility of 
constrains on a “more expansive and radical exercise of collective self-defense and 
military power in response to external strategic pressures” (Hughes, 2017a: 99). 
Interestingly enough, according to Yoshida’s memoir, any development of autonomous 
military capability and subsequently acquired competency to defend itself was deemed 
to be a pre-condition for terminating the U.S.-Japan security treaty, which was 
perceived as a temporary measure, filling “the vacuum in Japan’s defense that would 
result from the withdrawal of the occupation army after the peace treaty” (Yoshida 
1961; Terashima 2010). In the Secret Conversations Between Tokyo and Washington
54
 
(1956:160), Kiichi Miyazawa’s exchanges with Yoshida reveal the “diplomatic 
maneuver” praised by Kissinger as “the most farsighted and intelligent of any major 
nation in the postwar era” (quoted in Teraoka, 2015: 72): 
“It may sound devious, but let the Americans handle [our 
defense] until [rearmament]. It is indeed our Heaven-bestowed 
good fortune that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans 
complain, the Constitution gives us a perfect justification” 
Despite this persistent denial of a right to exercise even a limited form of 
collective self-defense, Prime Minister Abe successfully pushed forward the Cabinet 
Decision of July 1, 2014, followed by considerable amount of supporting legislation 
passed in 2015. The shift away from security being a matter of close interpretation of 
1947 Constitution, and more specifically, Article IX, has introduced “three new 
conditions”, which would constitute an adequate response to “fundamental 
transformation of the security environment surrounding Japan...[primarily a][s]hift in 
the global power balance”, allowing Japan to exercise force in response to situations 
where it does not necessarily find itself under direct attack: 
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 i. “When an armed attack against Japan occurs or when an armed 
attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a 
result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn 
people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; 
 ii. When there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack and 
ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; 
 iii. Use of force should be limited to the minimum extent necessary” 
(MOFA, 2016). 
The dominant rhetoric among the officials of Abe administration place 
the urgency of acquiring autonomous military capabilities in the context of Japan’s 
necessity to ensure its security through more burden-sharing with the U.S.. 
Nevertheless, there are voices, although largely marginalized, that call for autonomous 
capabilities not as a complementary alliance sustaining measure, but rather as a way to 
ensure independence and avoid implicit coercion emanating from other states 
(interviews conducted by Teraoka, 2015). If such voices become mainstream, the 
decreased dependence on the U.S., as a form of increased symmetry, might effectively 
be treated as a pre-condition of the eroding alliance. In the meantime, however, Hughes 
(2009: 294) not only suggests that such trajectory is highly unlikely, but also points out 
to the efforts on the part of Japanese policy makers to „manipulate the North Korean 
threat... to upgrade the U.S.-Japan alliance“ and „camouflage the fact“ that it is 
gradually entrapping the U.S. in an attempt to ensure that the „increasing and longer-
term threat from China“ is kept under control.   
Overall, the exhaustive Japanese efforts at developing a stronger military 
posture, which are still happening against the background of prevalent pacifism within 
the country, might partially explain a more cautious stance on the part of Washington in 
the Senkaku island contingency.  While it does represent a legitimate effort to burden-
share in response to continuous U.S. requests and accusations, it nevertheless means 
that with the increased military capacity comes increased assertiveness, which 





Chapter V. Summary and discussion  
On the whole, the in-depth context-dependent examination conducted 
throughout the case study stands as largely theoretical expectations- confirming case. 
More generally, it offers a few illuminating insights with regards to the conditions 
breeding security-dilemma- triggered alliance vulnerability. Importantly and on a par 
with expectations derived from realist scholarship, the study of allied interaction in the 
face of a salient crisis reveals that respective balance of abandonment-entrapment fears 
is initially dependent on the existence of an external agent, which carries a significant 
potential to be a disturbing factor in alliance solidarity, as witnessed by initial strategic 
inaction and vague statements issued throughout the course of Senkaku island dispute 
by the officials of the Obama administration. In a rather contrasting manner, the Trump 
administration, while issuing contradictory statements, has backed its commitments to 
the ally in the form of intensified operations “on the ground”. This is a clear example 
rhetoric being somewhat inconsistent with the policy trajectories illustrated by exact 
actions.  
Relatedly, the centrality of the external threat to alliance enduring quality is 
further demonstrated by coordinated alliance responses to the provocations in the form 
of intensified joint military operations as well as changes generated in Japan’s security 
trajectory, as evidenced by increasing attempts to redefine constitutional constrains, 
triggered by increasingly pressing need to engage in more burden-sharing in order to 
preserve the reputation of a reliable ally in the eyes of the U.S. policymakers. First, this 
shows that the internal, or domestic, reconfigurations, along with the  resulting foreign 
policy choices, carry a significant explanatory potential when it comes to assessing the 
severity of intra-alliance security dilemma. Second, it invites broader speculations if 
Japan and the U.S. still share a common vision and attach similar importance to 
enduring the endurance of their security ties. More specifically, the currently 
coordinated military activities, if examined with accompanying rhetoric on the both 
sides of the Atlantic, point to different directions: the U.S. perceiving military 
cooperation as a learning opportunity for Japan and its eventual embarking on an 
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autonomous path to solving contingencies it happens to be a party to, and Japanese 
policymakers and professionals perceiving the increasing institutionalization and 
routinization of practices as a sign of solidified adherence and dense collaboration in 
case a violent conflict breaks out.  
Similarly, the increasing capacity of Japan to engage in burden-sharing 
through the abolition of constitutional constraints and increases in defense budget can 
be interpreted as a distancing and insurance strategy, even if not supported by the 
dominant rhetoric. In particular, if assessed against all of the direct dependence criteria 
as set out by Snyder, Japan is diminishing reliance on the ally across all dimensions, 
which could be perceived as a sign that the alliance is losing its intrinsic value of being 
a credible “security umbrella”. After all, the hesitation of the Obama administration in 
the face of an evolving crisis not only triggered abandonment anxieties, expected to be 
resolved by the revision of the Guidelines, but also most likely accorded the U.S. with a 
reputation for unreliability in the eyes of Japanese policymakers.  Either way, the 
investigation has revealed that Japan was not awarded a broad scope of choices, given 
that the preservation of asymmetrical contribution to the alliance, contrary to Morrow’s 
(1991) expectations, would be detrimental to the immediate alliance durability, 
especially in the face of the bolder and more demanding Trump administration.  
Second, the mitigation of Japanese abandonment fears driven by general ups 
and downs in the U.S.-China relationship against the background of rising tensions in 
East China Sea region, through the revision of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation 
and repeated visits of Washington’s officials to Tokyo, signal that routinized 
interactions, and increasingly institutionalized and formalization of ties serve as a 
moderate basis for ensuring alliance durability.  The positive results largely confirm 
Snyder’s theoretical expectations about the soothing force of increasing the explicitness 
of contract and obligations, especially if accompanied by operationalization of such 
promises.  
Theoretically speaking, the entire investigation only further proves the 
necessity not to resort or rely too heavily on the theoretical expectations derived from a 
single school of thought, but instead merge different insights in an attempt to acquire 
more knowledge and establish clearer associations of driving forces behind the 
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phenomenon in question. Future theoretical inquiries into the subject matter will most 
likely benefit from comparative approaches, as well as a well-balanced analytical 
eclecticism approach. In the sphere of policymaking, such examinations are of crucial 
importance, given their capacity to uncover delicate tasks confronting diplomats and 
policymakers around the world, and highlighting the damages caused by failures to 
appreciate a fragile balance in the realm of security dilemma, and the subsequent lack of 
ability to exercise adequate security dilemma sensibility, which is carries detrimental 
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